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The Fate of "Unremovable" Aliens
Before and After September 11, 2001:
The Supreme Court's Presumptive
Six-Month Limit to Post-Removal-
Period Detention
"Americans are not a narrow tribe. Our blood is as the flood of the
Amazon, made up of a thousand noble currents all pouring into one."
-Herman Melville
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I. INTRODUCTION
March 1, 1998
I was born in Hamburg, Germany on January 14, 1948 in a refugee
camp ... my parents came form [sic] the U.S.S.R. We were
brought to the United States as legal permanent residents by
Catholic Services. I'm fifty-years old now and have been in the
United States for forty-eight years. In 1990 I went to jail ... and
when I was ready to go home the INS arrested me. Since
September 6, 1996, 1 have been waiting to be deported. Germany
has already told the INS that they will not accept me, have no
records of me at all or of my parents either .... I always showed
up in court and never ran from [the INS]. I asked them to release
me and I would go on my own, but they said no one would take me.
Why still hold me then?
-M.J. from Germany, Snyder County Jail, Selingsgrove
[sic], Pennsylvania'
United States Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan once wrote of
immigrants, "Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is
surely a 'person' . . . . Aliens, even aliens whose presence in this country is
unlawful, have long been recognized as 'persons' guaranteed due process of
law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."' Almost twenty years after
the Supreme Court recognized the due process rights of aliens, the Court is
still reviewing laws that attempt to deprive aliens of such rights. One of
these laws is the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act (IIRIRA) enacted in 1996, which altered numerous provisions of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).3 Under the IIRIRA, Congress
required the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to detain aliens
I. United States Locked Away: Inmigration Detainees in Jails in the United States, 10 HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH REPORT, No. I (G), Sept. 1998, available-at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/us-
immig/lns989-01 .htm#TopOfPage.
2. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982).
3. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (Supp. 1997))
[hereinafter IIRIRA].
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ordered deported during the removal period of ninety days.4 Another
provision of the IIRIRA, which applies to inadmissible or criminal aliens,
allows the Attorney General to detain an alien ordered removed beyond the
removal period, and does not limit the time of detention. 5 The law has been
described by one observer as "the most diverse, divisive and draconian
immigration law enacted since the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. ' '6
Since the United States did not have repatriation agreements with the
countries of many aliens, and removal was not accomplished, the INS
detained thousands of aliens indefinitely under the IIRIRA, in cases similar
to that of M.J. from Germany.7 Legal challenges resulted in a split between
the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits, which led the United States Supreme Court
to address the issue. When the Supreme Court consolidated these two cases
into one in Zadvydas v. Davis, the lives of about 3,800 detainees were at
stake.8  The Court held that where deportation is not "reasonably
foreseeable," the statute does not authorize continued detention.9 The Court
concluded that the statute had a presumptive post-removal detention period
of six months, after which, if the alien provides "good reason to believe that
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future, the government must respond with evidence.., to rebut [the alien's]
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)-(a)(2)(2001).
5. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2001). The statute in its entirety reads:
(6) Inadmissible or criminal aliens: An alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under
section 1182 of this title, removable under section 1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or
1227(a)(4) of this title or who has been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk
to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained
beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to the terms of supervision in
paragraph (3).
Id.
6. David M. Grable, Note, Personhood Under the Due Process Clause: A Constitutional
Analysis of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 83 CORNELL
L. REV. 820, 821 (1998) (citing Dan Danilov, U.S. Courts Offer No Protection from Latest
Immigration Law, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 17, 1996, at A 19).
7. M. Gavan Montague, Note, Should Aliens Be Indefinitely Detained Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231?
Suspect Doctrines and Legal Fictions Come Under Renewed Scrutiny, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1439,
1444-45 (2001) (explaining that the INS has interpreted the statute to allow for detention of
removable, deportable, and excludable aliens, since the IIRIRA does not distinguish between
excludable and deportable aliens, which has resulted in the INS detaining more aliens and
indefinitely detaining aliens previously labeled deportable who were not subject to indefinite
detention).
8. Henry Weinstein, The Supreme Court; Imprisonment of Immigrants Has Limits, Justices
Rule; Law: Government Can't Indefinitely Detain Criminals Whose Native Lands Will Not Take
Them Back, High Court Says, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 2001, at A27.
9. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699 (2001).
showing.'" Thus, the Supreme Court held that an alien may be detained
until it has been decided that there is no significant likelihood of removal in
the reasonably foreseeable future.1
This Comment will address the controversial issue presented in
Zadvydas, and the Supreme Court's resolution of this issue. Part II will
provide a brief background of immigration law in the United States, and will
explore the divergent interpretations of the IIRIRA in the Fifth and the Ninth
Circuits. Part III will explore the Supreme Court's decision in Zadvydas v.
Davis. Part IV will address the possible judicial, societal, and legislative
impact of the Court's decision.
II. IMMIGRATION LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, THE IIRIRA, AND THE
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE IIRIRA IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS
A. The "Plenary Power" Doctrine and Immigration Law
The United States Constitution does not clearly place the power to
control immigration with the federal government.' 2  During the early
nineteenth century, there was a question as to whether the states or the
federal government would control immigration. 3 The Supreme Court
decided that the power should lie with the federal government, partly
because decisions to admit or exclude aliens may be related to foreign
affairs.' 4 Since then, immigration law has focused on a distinction between
the legal rights of a permanent resident alien and aliens referred to as
"excludable" aliens. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have held that excludable
aliens are individuals who did not enter the United States legally, and thus
are considered to be standing at the border, and have little or no due process
rights to be free from indefinite detention.' 5 In contrast, the Supreme Court
10. Id. at 701.
I. Id. at 702.
12. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress the power to "establish an uniform Rule
of Naturalization," and thus allowing Congress to set immigration policy).
13. Charles Weisselberg, Prisoners of the INS, 28 HuM. RTS. 6, 6 (2001).
14. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950); see also
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (holding that in regard to
immigration matters, the judiciary should defer to the executive, as long as the act of the executive is
within the perimeters set by Congress). In United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, the Court
explained that "the exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The right to do so stems
not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign affairs
of the nation." Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. at 542.
15. Clay McCaslin, "My Jailor is My Judge": Kestutis Zadvydas and the Indefinite
Imprisonment of Permanent Resident Aliens by the INS, 75 TUL. L. REV. 193, 198 (2000); see also
Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 823-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that the Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognized that immigration laws have made a distinction between aliens who have come to our
shores seeking admission and those that are in the United States, irrespective of the legality, for
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has held that resident aliens, individuals that entered the United States
legally and were granted the right to remain here indefinitely, are entitled to
fundamental rights and due process. 16  Courts that have held that the
indefinite detention of a resident alien does not violate due process have
relied on the plenary power doctrine. 17 However, the plenary power or
control of Congress is subject to limited judicial review in certain cases.18
As United States district court Judge Terry J. Hatter, Jr. wrote,
"detention threatens the deprivation of a fundamental liberty interest," and
triggers heightened scrutiny rather than judicial deference. 19 In Zadvydas v.
Davis, the Supreme Court also recognized this limitation, and noted that the
cases before the Court did not require a determination of the authority of the
political branches to control entry into the country.z While acknowledging
the limitation of judicial review, the Court pointed out that it was not
considering terrorism or other special circumstances where arguments might
be made for deference to political branches on matters of national security.2'
which the Court has recognized additional rights and privileges not extended to those in the first
category), vacated sub noa. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 68 (2001), amended by sub norm. Ma v.
Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2001).
16. Clay McCaslin, "My Jailor Is My Judge": Kestutis Zadvydas and the Indefinite
Imprisonment of Permanent Resident Aliens by the INS, 75 TUL. L. REV. 193, 198 (2000) (citing
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982); Leng May
Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958)).
17. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 295-96 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting many cases
where the courts relied on the plenary power doctrine), aff'd, modified sub noam. Zadvydas v. Davis,
285 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2002), vacated by 533 U.S. 678 (2001); see also Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) (explaining that Congress has "broad power under the Necessary
and Proper Clause to enact legislation for the regulation of foreign affairs"); Ekiu v. United States,
142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (stating that in the United States the power to admit and expel aliens "is
vested in the national government, to which the Constitution has committed the entire control of
international relations, in peace as well as in war [and] it belongs to the political department of the
government"); Marisel Acosta, Comment, "Unremovable" Criminal Resident Aliens Awaiting
Deportation: Can the INS Detain Them Indefinitely?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 1363, 1370 (2000) (noting
that the United States has plenary authority to decide when it will deny hospitality to a non-citizen);
Amy Langenfeld, Comment, Living in Limbo: Mandatory Detention ofImmigrants Under the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of1996,31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1041, 1059 (1999).
18. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S 678, 695 (2001) (stating that the plenary power of Congress is
subject to "important constitutional limitations" and citing to INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941-42
(1983), and The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889)); see also Matthews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (stating that any rule that would "inhibit the flexibility of the political branches of
government to respond to changing world conditions" is suspect).
19. In re Indefinite Detention Cases, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1101 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that
the plenary power doctrine did not support a deferential standard of review of the petitioner's
detention).
20. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695.
2 1. Id. at 696. The Court noted that in such cases as terrorism, "special arguments" for
preventive detention could be made. Id.
In fact, in matters of national security, courts have invoked the plenary
power doctrine and deferred to the legislative and executive branches.2
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on our nation and the
detention of suspected terrorists, it will be interesting to see if a special
argument for detention is brought before the Supreme Court, forcing the
Court to address an issue it made clear it was not dealing with in Zadvydas.
Regardless, the Supreme Court's decision in Zadvydas may be a landmark
case because it "'endorses the fundamental principle of judicial review in
immigration cases,"' rather than traditional judicial deference.23
B. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IRIRA)
The IIRIRA alters the INA, which authorizes the Attorney General to
detain both deportable and excludable aliens during the removal period,
including aliens ordered removed for committing crimes.24  When
considering the amendment to the INA, the House explained in a report,
"[t]he United States is a nation of immigration. This proud tradition has
been tarnished in recent decades by failures to set clear priorities in our
system of legal immigration and to enact and enforce the measures necessary
to prevent the rising tide of illegal immigration."25 The House continued to
explain that "[u]nlimited immigration is a moral and practical impossibility.
In the words of the 1981 report of the Select Commission on Immigration
and Refugee Policy, '[o]ur policy-while providing opportunity for a portion
of the world's population-must be guided by the basic national interests of
the United States."''2 6 The House stated that there had been a failure in
immigration policy and enforcement, and began a review of immigration
law.2 7 The House noted that the Immigration in the National Interest Act of
1995 was originally introduced as House Bill 1915 and was later re-
introduced as House Bill 2202; this Act aimed at fixing immigration
problems by enacting "the most comprehensive reform of American
22. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 547 (1950)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (explaining that Knauff was a German citizen who was excluded by the
United States, even though she was married to an American army veteran, based on unsubstantiated
allegations that she was a spy and thus a threat to national security).
23. David G. Savage, Keeping the Doors Open: Court Upholds Rights for Aliens with Criminal
Records, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2001, at 34 (quoting Lucas Guttentag, who directs the ACLU'S Immigrants
Rights Project and who argued the case in the Court on behalf of Enrico St. Cyr, a Haitian immigrant
who had lived in the United States for 10 years, but faced deportation as a result of pleading guilty in
early 1996 to selling a controlled substance).
24. 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(2) (2001).
25. H.R. REP. NO. 104-879, at 104 (1997).
26. Id. (alteration in original).
27. Id.
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immigration policy in the past generation. 28 The House acknowledged that
prior legislation, such as the Immigration Act of 1965, the Refugee Act of
1980, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, and the
Immigration Act of 1990 had a great impact on immigration policy, but
provisions of these laws played a role in the current problems "by failing to
set clear priorities for our immigration system, and failing to provide tough
sanctions against those who violate our immigration laws. 29 House Bill
2202 eventually became the IIRIRA, and contained the same detention
provisions. 30  On August 4, 1995, Representative Lamar Smith introduced
House Bill 2202 and referred it to the full Committee on the Judiciary and to
the Committees on National Security, Government Reform and Oversight,
Ways and Means, and Banking and Financial Services. 31 The Committee on
the Judiciary favorably reported House Bill 2202 to the House on March 4,
1996.32
Between March 19 and 21, 1996, the House considered House Bill 2202
and adopted many amendments.33 On March 21, 1996, the House rejected a
motion to recommit House Bill 2202 to the Committee on the Judiciary with
instructions, but "the House then passed House Bill 2202 as amended by a
recorded vote of 333-87. ' '3 On May 2, 1996, the Senate passed House Bill
2202, but with an amendment altering the language.35 On May 13, 1996, the
Senate insisted on its amendment and requested a conference; and on
September 11, 1996, the House disagreed to the Senate amendment, but
agreed to a conference.36 The House and Senate agreed to file a conference
report, and the House agreed to the report by a recorded vote of 370-37. 37
28. Id. at 105.
29. Id. The House commented that the laws "failed to treat migration as a comprehensive
phenomenon, and failed to make the tough choices on priorities that would restore credibility both to
our systems of admitting legal immigrants and deterring, apprehending, and removing illegal
immigrants." Id.
30. H.R. 2202, 104th Cong. § 305 (1995); see also Matthew E. Hedberg, Kim Ho Ma v. Reno:
Cloaking Judicial Activism as Constitutional Avoidance, 76 WASH. L. REV. 669, 673-79 (2001)
(explaining in-depth the legislative history of the IIRIRA).
31. H.R. REP. No. 104-879 at 118. On September 19, 1995, House Bill 2202 was re-referred to
the Committee on the Judiciary (in addition to the Committees on Agriculture, Banking and
Financial Services, Economic and Educational Opportunities, Government Reform and Oversight,
National Security, and Ways and Means). Id.
32. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 104-469(lV), at pt. I (1995)).
33. Id. at 121.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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On September 30, 1996, the Senate agreed to the conference report, and the
measure was approved by the President.38 Former President Clinton signed
the IIRIRA into law on September 30, 1996. 39
The heart of the controversy over indefinite detention under the IIRIRA
lies in Title 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), which covers the detention of excludable
and deportable aliens beyond the ninety-day removal period. 40 The IIRIRA
amends the INA by requiring that the Attorney General detain certain aliens
after the INS ordered their removal, during the ninety-day removal period.4'
Section 241 of Title 8 of the United States Code supplements section
1231 (a)(6) allowing for detention.42 Section 241.4 applies to criminal aliens,
and states that the district director may continue to detain an alien ordered
removed beyond the removal period, if the alien is removable under certain
sections of the Act, or if the alien demonstrates a serious risk of non-
compliance with the removal order.43 Section 241 also places the burden of
proof for release after the ninety-day removal period on the alien, and
requires clear and convincing evidence that the release would not be a
danger to the community or present a significant flight risk.44 Thus, absent
such a showing by the alien, Congress authorizes continued detention of
criminal aliens beyond a ninety-day period.
Shortly after a district court in Washington held that the continued
detention of deportable aliens under Section 1231 (a)(6) whose deportations
were unsuccessful violated the Constitution, the INS released interim
38. Id.
39. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-828, at 210-11, 215-16 (1996); see also Matthew E. Hedberg,
Note, Kim Ho Ma v. Reno: Cloaking Judicial Activism as Constitutional Avoidance, 76 WASH. L.
REV. 669, 673-77 (2001) (explaining in-depth the legislative history of the IIRIRA).
40. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (2001).
41. Id. Section 123 1(a)(3) and section (a)(4) address the supervision of aliens released after the
ninety-day removal period in the United States and the removal of aliens arrested, imprisoned, on
parole, on supervised release, or probation at the time removal is ordered. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(3)-
(a)(4) (2001). Subsection 1231(a)(5) concerns reinstating removal orders for an alien that has
illegally re-entered the country. 8 U.S.C. § 123 l(a)(5) (2001).
42. 8 U.S.C. § 241 (2001).
43. 8 U.S.C. § 241.4 (2001).
44. Id. During this analysis, the statute requires INS district directors to take into account the
following factors:
(I) [T]he nature and seriousness of the alien's criminal convictions;
(2) Other criminal history;
(3) Sentence(s) imposed and time actually served;
(4) History of failures to appear for court (defaults);
(5) Probation history;
(6) Disciplinary problems while incarcerated;
(7) Evidence of rehabilitative efforts or recidivism;
(8) Equities in the United States; and
(9) Prior immigration violations and history.
8 C.F.R. § 241.4(a) (2001).
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procedures.45 The district court's decision resulted in the release of a large
number of undeportable aliens, and the interim procedures were an attempt
by the INS to address due process concerns and end the court-ordered
release of many aliens.46 However, the majority of district courts continued
to hold that while the language of Section 1231(a)(6) authorized the
indefinite detention of aliens, the detention violated the due process rights of
the aliens and was unconstitutional. 7 Further, without addressing whether
the statute authorized indefinite detention, United States district court Judge
Terry J. Hatter, Jr. held that the indefinite detention of deportable aliens
violated the due process rights of resident aliens.45
C. The Fifth Circuit's Interpretation of the IIRIRA." Zadvydas v. Underdown
Kestutis Zadvydas immigrated to the United States with his parents at
the age of eight, after he and his family spent the years following World War
11 in a displaced persons camp in Germany.49 Zadvydas arrived in America
in 1956, becoming a resident alien, but not a citizen. Zadvydas'
encounters with crime began at the young age of eighteen when he was
convicted of attempted robbery, and the INS began deportation proceedings
in 1977. 51 Zadvydas neglected to appear for an INS hearing, and the agency
45. Daniel R. Dinger, When We Cannot Deport, Is it Fair to Detain?: An Analysis of the Rights
of Deportable Aliens Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) and the 1999 INS Interim Procedures Governing
Detention, 00 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1551, 1575 (2000) (citing Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (W.D.
Wash. 1999), affd sub norn. Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated sub nom. Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), amended sub nom. Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2001)).
46. Id.
47. Id. These cases include Kay v. Reno, 94 F. Supp. 2d 546 (M.D. Pa. 2000); Nguyen v.
Fasano, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (S.D. Cal. 2000); Sengchanh v. Lanier, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (N.D. Ga.
2000); Hermanowski v. Farquharson, 39 F. Supp. 2d 148 (D. R.I. 1999); Vo v. Greene, 63 F. Supp.
2d 1278 (D. Co. 1999); Zadvydas v. Caplinger, 986 F. Supp. 1011 (E.D. La. 1997). Id. at 1576,
n.125.
48. In re Indefinite Detention Cases, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1100 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (noting that as
the probability of deportation by the government decreases, so does the government's interest in
detaining the alien indefinitely, and the denial of the alien's liberty becomes more severe). The Ninth
Circuit later upheld Judge Hatter's ruling. See Henry Weinstein, California and the West Court
Bans the Indefinite Detention of Immigrants INS: Appellate Judges Overrule the Policy Under
Which Convicts Who Can't Be Deported to Their Homelands are Kept in Prison Even After They'ye
Served Their Time, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 11, 2000, at A3 (noting that "the ruling upholds decisions by a
special panel of five federal trial judges in Seattle and U.S. District Judge Terry J. Hatter in Los
Angeles, who have said the INS policy violated the immigrants' rights").
49. Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 291-92 (5th Cir. 1999), aft'd, modified sub nom.
Zadvydas v. Davis, 285 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2002), vacated by 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
50. Id. at 283.
51. United States v. Zadvydas, 986 F. Supp. 1011, 1014 (E.D. La. 1997), rev'd sub nom.
Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999), vacated sub nom. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
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could not locate him for ten years.52 However, he was arrested again, served
two years in prison, and was released on parole.53 The INS renewed its
deportation proceedings, but because Zadvydas was a "stateless" person, and
did not have citizenship in any other country, his removal was
unsuccessful.54 In Zadvydas, the Fifth Circuit founded its holding that the
detention was constitutional on the principle that resident aliens do not have
more constitutional rights than excludable aliens under the Constitution
when the national interest is the same and the aliens have similar
circumstances.55 Like many other courts upholding indefinite detention, the
Fifth Circuit relied on the plenary power doctrine requiring judicial
deference.56 In exercising what the court called judicial deference and
equating the rights of resident aliens with those of excludable aliens, the
Fifth Circuit held that even when an alien is legally in the country, "once he
has been ordered deported, he is stripped of his constitutional rights. 5 7
Thus, immigrants like Zadvydas, who have been in the country since
childhood, have the same constitutional protections as those who want to
enter the country for the first time. Applying this rationale, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that similar to excludable aliens, the continued detention of a
resident alien did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.5 8 If
courts follow the path of the Fifth Circuit by likening permanent resident
aliens with excludable aliens, even though they do not have the same
constitutional rights, courts may allow Congress' sovereign immigration
powers to trump the secured liberty interests of permanent residents, which
some argue has no basis in either constitutional or common law history.5 9
U.S. 678 (2001), aff'd, modilied, 285 F.3d 398 (2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 3779 (5th Cir. 2002).
52. Id. During this time, Zadvydas had a job, filed income taxes, and received an extension or
reissuance of his green card. Id.
53. Id. at 1014-15.
54. Zadvydas, 185 F.3d at 283-84 (both Germany and Lithuania refused to accept Zadvydas).
55. Id. at 294-97.
56. Id. at 294 (noting that Zadvydas' detention is currently within the government's plenary
immigration power).
57. Lisa Cox, Comment, The Legal Limbo of Indefinite Detention: How Low Can You Go?, 50
AM. U. L. REV. 725, 744-45 (2001).
58. Zadvydas, 185 F.3d at 296-97 (noting that there was no violation as long as good faith efforts
to deport the resident alien continued and reasonable parole and review procedures existed). The
Tenth Circuit has also reasoned that resident aliens are in the same position regarding due process
rights as excludable aliens under the Constitution. See Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045, 1059-60 (10th
Cir. 2000) (holding that there was no due process obstacle to the continued detention of removable
aliens under the Act), overruled in part by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). The Tenth
Circuit found that § 123 l(a)(6) "is not ambiguous" and "places no time limit" on the authority of the
Attorney General to detain aliens beyond the ninety-day removal period. Id. at 1056-57.
59. Alexandra E. Chopin, Comment, Disappearing Due Process: The Case for Indefinitely
Detained Permanent Residents' Retention of Their Constitutional Entitlement Following a
Deportation Order, 49 EMORY L.J. 1261, 1302 (2000).
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D. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation of the JIRIRA: Ma v. Reno
As a two-year old citizen of Cambodia, Kim Ho Ma lawfully entered the
United States as a refugee and has lived in the United States as a legal
permanent resident since the age of six. 60 However, Ma was convicted of
manslaughter at the age of seventeen, which qualified him for deportation.6'
After Ma completed his prison sentence, the INS took him into custody and
ordered Ma removed. 62 The INS began removal proceedings, and Ma made
motions for release, but an immigration judge found Ma deportable because
his release would present a danger to the community. 63  Since the United
States had no repatriation agreement with Cambodia, Ma could not be
removed within the ninety-day removal period during which his detention
was mandatory. 64 Ma filed a petition in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Washington for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that
the INS violated his due process rights by indefinitely detaining him.
65
When the Ninth Circuit heard his case, Ma had been in custody for almost
five years.66 Ma's sentence constituted about two years of that period. 67 Six
months after Ma's removal order, the INS undertook its ninety day custody
review to decide if it should release Ma. 68  After interviewing Ma and
reviewing materials submitted by his family and friends, an INS officer
prepared a report which noted that Ma's family was very supportive, and, if
he was released, his brother would give him a job, and Ma could assist his
handicapped father on a daily basis. 69 However, the deputy district director
60. Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 818 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated sub nom. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678 (2001), amendedsub nom. Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2001).
61. Id. at 818-19. Ma's conviction qualified him for removal as an alien convicted of particular
crimes under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2). Id.
62. Id. at 818.
63. Id. at 818-19.
64. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(I)(A) & (a)(6) (requiring detention).
65. Ma, 208 F.3d at 818-19. In the same district court, over one hundred habeas corpus
petitioners challenged their continued detention by the INS in similar cases. Id. at 818 n.2. The
district court chose five lead cases that contained issues common to all petitioners and had the parties
argue those issues before five district court judges. Id. The five judges issued a joint order creating
a legal framework to apply in each case. Id. A judge then applied this ruling to Ma and held that he
should be released. Id. There have been similar cases involving a great number of habeas
petitioners in Nevada and the Central, Eastern, and Southern Districts of California. Id.
66. Id. at 819.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 819-20.
779
denied Ma's release by form letter, which did not include any specific
reasons for denial, and stipulated that the decision was not appealable.7 °
The INS reviewed its decision,71 but determined that Ma should remain
in custody because his conviction was serious, and also because of his
threatened participation in a hunger strike if kept in custody.72 The
reviewers concluded that they could not find that Ma would not be violent
and follow the terms of his release.73 The district court reviewed Ma's
habeas petition and held his detention unconstitutional because the court
found that his detention violated substantive due process and ordered Ma
released to await disposition of his appeal.7 ' Both the Ninth Circuit and the
Supreme Court denied the INS' attempts to stay the release order, and the
INS appealed the district court's order which granted Ma's petition.75
In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit noted that under the statute, aliens who
cannot be removed after the expiration of ninety days fall into two groups.76
The first group must be released under supervisory regulations that require
the aliens to appear regularly before an immigration officer. 77  The Ninth
Circuit stated that aliens in the second group "'may be detained beyond the
removal period' and, if released, shall be subject to the same supervisory
provisions" as the aliens in the first group.78 The second group includes
aliens who are removable because of criminal convictions, such as Kim Ho
Ma. 79  The court noted that while the statute allows for the detention of
group two aliens beyond ninety days, it says nothing about how long
detention is authorized beyond the ninety-day period.8° The court concluded
that "any construction of the statute must read in some provision concerning
70. Id. at 820. "The letter [did state] that Ma's case would be reviewed again six months from
the date of the letter... [and] that Ma had the right to submit a request for redetermination of his
custody status at any time." Id. at 820 n.7.
71. Id. at 820.
72. Id.
73. Id. The reviewers made this conclusion despite the abundant information about Ma's
relationships with his family, employment prospects, and plans to avoid gangs and criminal
behavior. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 820. After Ma and the other "petitioners prevailed in district court, the INS
implemented the 'Pearson 11' regulations, which provided for additional review of custody decisions.
These regulations [allow] review of [the] decisions of district directors by [the] INS Headquarters,
which was then done in this case." Id. at 820 n.8.
76. ld.at821.
77. Id. The statute requires the aliens to provide information to the INS official, notify the INS of
any alterations in their employment or residence within 48 hours, undergo medical and psychiatric
testing, and obey restrictions on their travel. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(3) (2000)).
78. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(6) (2000)).
79. Id. The court cited to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a),2) and pointed out that the criminal convictions
include "drug offenses, certain crimes of moral turpitude, 'aggravated felonies,' firearms offenses,
and various other crimes." Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2000)).
80. Id. (citing § 1227(a)(2)).
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the length of time beyond the removal period detention may continue,
whether it be 'indefinitely,' 'for a reasonable time,' or some other temporal
measure."'" The court held that Congress did not grant the INS authority to
indefinitely detain aliens like Ma, and construed the statute as allowing the
INS to detain aliens only for a reasonable time after the removal period.82
The Ninth Circuit concluded that in cases where an alien has entered the
United States and there is "no reasonable likelihood that a foreign
government will accept the alien's return in the reasonably foreseeable
future," the statute does not allow the Attorney General to detain the alien
beyond the removal period provided in the statute, and the alien must be
released subject to the statutory supervision provisions.83
The court gave four reasons for its holding. First, the court wrote that
the most important reason was that the result allowed the court to avoid
determining whether or not indefinitely detaining aliens violated the aliens'
due process rights.84 Second, the court reasoned that the holding "better
comport[ed]" with the statutory language and allowed the court to avoid
assuming that Congress intended the harsh result of indefinitely detaining
aliens without such a clear statement of congressional intent.85 Third, the
court reasoned that the interpretation of an implicit "reasonable time"
limitation was consistent with the court's "case law interpreting a similar
provision in a prior immigration statute.' 86 Finally, the court found that its
81. Id. The court pointed out that it recognized that generally the Attorney General's
interpretation of the immigration laws is entitled to substantial deference, but the Court has also held
this principle does not apply "where a substantial constitutional question is raised by an agency's
interpretation of a statute it is authorized to construe." Id. at 821 n.13.
82. Id. at 822.
83. Id.
84. Id. The court pointed out that the Supreme Court has held that courts should interpret statutes
in a manner that avoids deciding substantial constitutional questions, which the court refers to as a
"paramount principle of judicial restraint." Id. Also, the court noted that regarding immigration,
courts have often read limitations into statutes that seemed to give broad power to immigration
officials in order to avoid constitutional problems. Id. The court also acknowledged the Fifth
Circuit's holding in Zadvydas, "that long-term detention of removable aliens who have been ordered
deported does not violate substantive due process," and noted that although the court seriously
questioned the Fifth Circuit's conclusion in that case, the court did not need to reach the
constitutional question. Id. at 825 n.23. The court pointed out that at the very least, Zadvydas made
it clear "that a substantial constitutional question exists regarding the construction of [section]
1231 (a)(6)." Id. at 826 n.23.
85. Id. at 822. The court pointed out that the provision stating that "the INS may hold
individuals 'beyond' a specified time demonstrates Congress's intent" that the agency have some
flexibility where additional time may be useful, but does not demonstrate an intent "to allow the INS
to hold people in detention for the remainder of their lives." Id. at 827.
86. Id. at 822. The court stated that the conclusion that a "reasonable time" limitation is implicit
in the statute is supported by a line of Ninth Circuit cases holding that a "predecessor provision must
interpretation was more consistent with international law.87 The court
concluded that in Ma's case, the district court correctly concluded that there
was "not a reasonable likelihood that the INS [would] be able to remove Ma
to Cambodia."88  Thus, the court concluded that without a repatriation
agreement, extant or pending, the court had to agree with the district court
that there was no reasonable likelihood that the INS could remove Ma, and,
thus, the INS could not detain Ma any longer.89
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S REJECTION OF INDEFINITE DETENTION OF
UNREMOVABLE ALIENS UNDER THE IlRIRA: ZADVYDAS V. DAVIS
Justice Breyer wrote the Court's opinion concluding that, because the
Court interpreted the statute to avoid a serious constitutional threat, once
removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no
longer authorized by statute.90 The Court began the opinion by noting that
the decision only addressed aliens who were admitted to the United States,
but later ordered removed, and that aliens who had not yet gained admission
to the United States posed a different issue.9 The Court consolidated the
two aforementioned cases, Zadvydas and Ma, in its decision in order to
be construed as allowing only for detention 'reasonably' beyond the removal period." Id. at 828.
87. ld. at 822. The court explained that in interpreting the statute to include a reasonable time
limitation, the court was also influenced by amicus curiae Human Rights Watch's argument that the
court "should apply the well-established Charming Betsy rule of statutory construction[,] which
requires that [a court] generally construe [c]ongressional legislation to avoid violating international
law." Id. at 829-30.
88. Id. at 831. The court noted that although the INS presented:
evidence that the State Department has submitted a proposal for a repatriation agreement
to the Cambodian government, both sides agreed that the United States has no
functioning repatriation agreement with that country, that the Cambodian government
does not presently accept the return of its nationals from the United States, and that it has
not announced a willingness to enter into an agreement to do so in the foreseeable future,
(or indeed at any time).
Id.
89. Id.; see also Matthew E. Hedberg, Kim Ho Ma v. Reno: Cloaking Judicial Activism as
Constitutional Avoidance, 76 WASH. L. RtV. 669 (2001) (arguing that the Ninth Circuit used
constitutional avoidance as a "guise" for creating an exception to the detention statute "by forbidding
the Attorney General from detaining deportable aliens beyond the removal period if the removal
[could] not be accomplished in the reasonably foreseeable future").
90. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682, 699 (2001). The statute referred to is 8 U.S.C. §
123 1(a)(6), a statute that authorizes further detention if the government fails to remove the alien
during the ninety-day removal period. Id. at 682. The Court quoted the statute:
"An alien ordered removed [1] who is inadmissible ... [2] [or] removable [as a result of
violations of status requirements or entry conditions, violations of criminal law, or
reasons of security or foreign policy] or [3] who has been determined by the Attorney
General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal,
may be detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to [certain]
terms of supervision . ...
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(6) (West Supp. 1994)).
91. Id.
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resolve the split between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. 92 Zadvydas asked the
Court to review the decision of the Fifth Circuit allowing his continued
detention, and the Government asked the Court to reconsider the Ninth
Circuit's decision to release Ma.
93
After explaining the Court's jurisdiction to hear the cases, the Court
acknowledged that it is a basic tenet of statutory interpretation that
"whenever an Act of Congress raises 'a serious doubt' as to its
constitutionality, 'this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided."' 94 The
Court also pointed out that it has read "significant limitations" into other
immigration statutes in order to avoid finding them unconstitutional and
invalidating them.95 Applying this strategy, the Court found that the statute
"limits an alien's post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably
necessary to bring about that alien's removal from the United States," and it
does not permit indefinite detention.96
The Court began its analysis by pointing out that a statute which
allowed indefinite detention would raise a serious constitutional problem,
because the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause forbids the Government
from depriving "any 'person... of... liberty.., without due process of
law."' 97  The Court emphasized that the core of the liberty the Clause
protects is the freedom from imprisonment, including government detention,
custody, or other forms of physical restraint. 98 The Court has held that
government detention violates that Clause, unless the alien's detention is
ordered under certain conditions, including a criminal proceeding, with
adequate procedural protections.99 In this case, the Court found that the
proceedings were civil, rather than criminal, and that they had a non-punitive
purpose and effect.' 00  In addition, the Court found there was not a
92. Id. at 684. The Court explained the histories of both detainees. Id. at 684-85.
93. Id. at 686.
94. Id. at 689 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 690 (alterations in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
98. Id.
99. Id. Other conditions include "special and 'narrow' non-punitive 'circumstances,' where a
special justification," like a potentially harmful mental illness, "outweighs the 'individual's
constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint."' Id. (citation omitted) (quoting
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997)).
100. Id.
"sufficiently strong special justification" in this case for indefinite civil
detention under this statute.1
01
The Court then addressed the Government's argument that the statute
had two regulatory goals: "'ensuring the appearance of aliens at future
immigration proceedings,"' and "'[p]reventing danger to the
community.',' 0 2  The Court rejected the first justification because it
reasoned that "by definition," preventing the alien's flight is weak or absent
when removal is a "remote possibility" at best. 0 3 In regard to the second
justification of protecting the community, the Court stated that while its
importance does not necessarily diminish over time, the Court has upheld
"preventive detention" because of danger to the community only when the
detention is limited to "specially dangerous individuals" and strong
procedural protections exist. 0 4 The Court found that this case presented the
possibility of permanent civil confinement, and that the provision
authorizing detention did not apply narrowly to "'a small segment of
particularly dangerous individuals,"' such as potential terrorists, but widely
to aliens ordered removed for multifarious reasons, including tourist visa
violations. 0 5 Thus, the Court concluded that once there is no justified flight
risk, the only special circumstance is the alien's removable status, which is
not related to the dangerousness of the detainee.
0 6
The Court was also not persuaded that the administrative proceedings
provided aliens with adequate procedural protections, when the alien had the
burden of proving he is not dangerous, and there was not significant judicial
review.' '7 The Court was also not convinced by the Government's argument
that alien status itself can justify indefinite detention. 8 The Court
differentiated the main case on which the Government relied, Shaughnessy
v. United States ex rel. Mezei, from the present case, because that case
101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondents in Zadvydas at 24, Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678
(2001) (No. 99-7791)).
103. Id. The Court cited to Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), where it explained that when
"detention's goal is no longer practically attainable, detention no longer 'bear[s] [a] reasonable
relation to the purpose for which the individual [was] committed."' Id. (alterations in original)
(quoting Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738).
104. Id. at 691. The Court noted that in cases where preventive detention is "of potentially
indefinite duration," the Court has also required a special circumstance in addition to the
dangerousness rationale, such as mental illness, which helps to create the danger. Id. (citing Kansas
v. 1-lendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358, 368 (1997)).
105. Id. (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 368).
106. Id. at 691-92.
107. Id. at 692.
108. Id. at 692-93. The Government relied on Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345
U.S. 206 (1953), which involved a lawfully admitted alien who left the United States, returned after
a trip abroad, was denied admission, and was indefinitely detained on Ellis Island, because the
government was unable to find another country to accept him. Id. at 692. The Court in that case
held that Mezei's detention was constitutional. Id.
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involved an excludable alien who was 'treated, for constitutional purposes,
'as if stopped at the border." ' 10 9 The Court pointed out that the distinction
between an alien who has entered "the United States and one who has never
entered runs throughout immigration law."" 0  The Court reiterated that
established constitutional safeguards protect persons inside the United States
that are unavailable to aliens outside the borders of the United States."' The
Court concluded that upon entry into the country, the alien's legal
circumstance rights change, because "the Due Process Clause applies to all
'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence
here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent."'"12  Specifically, the
Court noted that it has held that the Due Process Clause protects aliens that
are susceptible to a final order of deportation. 13
The Court also ultimately rejected the Government's argument that
Congress has "plenary power" to establish immigration law, and that the
judicial branch must yield to the decisions of the executive and legislative
branches in that area. 14 The Court emphasized the fact that in the relevant
cases, the Court focused upon limitations on the plenary power doctrine." 5
The Court pointed out that it did not deny the right of Congress to remove
aliens, to assign them to supervision with conditions after release, or to
incarcerate them for violation of those conditions."16  In fact, the Court
reiterated that the Ninth Circuit's point, that determining whether
indefinitely detaining deportable resident aliens that have been removed
under the IIRIRA was constitutional, did not require the Court to consider
the power of the political branches "to control entry into the United
109. Id. at 693 (explaining that this made all the difference in the Mezei case) (quoting Mezei, 345
U.S. at 213, 215).
110. Id.
11. Id. (noting that the Fifth Amendment's protections do not extend to aliens outside the United
States' boundaries).
112. Id.; see also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (concluding that "all
persons within the territory of the United States are entitled to the protection guaranteed by [the Fifth
and Sixth] [A]mendments"); Id. at 242 (Field, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("The term
'person,' used in the Fifth Amendment is broad enough to include any and every human being
within the jurisdiction of the republic. A resident, alien born, is entitled to the same protection under
the laws that a citizen is entitled to."); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (holding that
the due process and equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment "are universal in their
application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race,
of color, or of nationality").
113. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693-94 (citing Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 238, and noting that the nature
of that protection may vary depending upon "status and circumstance").
114. Id.at695.
115. Id.
116. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (a)(3) (West Supp. 1994)).
States."'"17 Further, it did not require the Court to consider "terrorism or
other special circumstances where special arguments might be made for
forms of preventive detention and for heightened deference to the judgments
of the political branches with respect to matters of national security.""' 8
The Court also rejected the Government's argument that aliens had a
reduced liberty interest because they did not have a legal right to live in the
country. 19  The Court reasoned that it is not a choice "between
imprisonment and the alien 'living at large[;]' [rather,] [i]t is between
imprisonment and released supervision with conditions that may not be
violated."'' 20 The next issue that the Court had to address was congressional
intent. The Court acknowledged that, "if 'Congress has made its intent' in
the statute 'clear, we must give effect to that intent.""12' The Court
concluded that it could not find any congressional intent to grant the
Attorney General the power to indefinitely detain an alien ordered
removed. 22 The Court noted that the statute includes the word "may," but
emphasized that this does not grant the Attorney General boundless
discretion, and that "if Congress had meant to authorize long-term detention
of unremovable aliens, it certainly could have spoken in clearer terms."'
123
The Court also looked to the history of the IIRIRA, including the INA,
and concluded that it found no indications of a congressional intent to permit
indefinite and possibly permanent detention. 24  Thus, to avoid a
constitutional problem, the Court concluded that "once removal is no longer
reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by
statute." 25
The Court also rejected the Government's argument that, even applying
the Court's statutory limitation, a federal habeas court must believe the
Government regarding whether the statutory limits had been respected in a
certain case, and could conduct little or no independent review of the
issue.'2 6 The Court concluded that the determination of whether a set of
117. Id. at 696.
118. Id. (explaining that the Government did not explain how a court's determination of "the
likelihood of repatriation, if handled with appropriate sensitivity, could make a significant difference
in this case").
119. Id.
120. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondents in Zadvydas at 47, Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678
(2001) (No. 99-7791)).
121. Id. (quoting Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 336 (2000)).
122. Id. at 697.
123. Id. (quoting to 8 U.S.C. § 1537(b)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1994) in stating that .'[i]f no country is
willing to receive' a terrorist alien ordered removed, 'the Attorney General may, notwithstanding
any other provision of law, retain the alien in custody' and must review the detention determination
every six months").
124. Id. at 699.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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particular circumstances satisfies the limitation of detention within
reasonable time necessary to secure removal according to statutory authority
is one for the courts to decide. 27 The Court reasoned that the basic federal
habeas corpus statute grants the power to decide this issue to the federal
courts. 28 The Court explained that this allows the courts to carry out "what
this Court has described as the 'historic purpose of the writ,' namely 'to
relieve detention by executive authorities without judicial trial.""' 2 9  The
Court set guidelines for the habeas court, which must ask whether the
detention at issue exceeds a reasonable period to secure removal, and
"measure reasonableness primarily in terms of the statute's basic purpose,
namely assuring the alien's presence at the moment of removal."'3 ° Thus,
the Court mandated that when removal is not reasonably foreseeable, a court
should find the continued detention unreasonable and not authorized by
statute. 31
The Court acknowledged that principles of judicial review in this area
recognize the primary responsibility of the executive branch and advise
judges to give expert agencies decision-making leeway in areas involving
their expertise.132  Importantly, the Court pointed out that these principles
require courts to listen carefully to the government's foreign policy
judgments, including its judgment on the status of repatriation negotiations
at issue, and "to grant the Government appropriate leeway when its
judgments rest upon foreign policy expertise.' 33  As previously mentioned,
the Court reiterated the Ninth Circuit's point that the rejection of indefinite
detention under the IIRIRA was not based on a case concerning national
security or a terrorist situation, which may require more judicial
127. Id.
128. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2001), which gives the courts the authority to decide
whether detention is "in violation of the... laws... of the United States").
129. Id. (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 533 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 699-700 (noting that the alien's release should be conditioned on any of the different
forms of supervised release as appropriate in the case, and the alien may be returned to custody if he
violates any of those conditions). Likewise, the Court explained that "if removal is reasonably
foreseeable, [then] the habeas court should consider the risk of the alien[] committing further crimes
as a factor" that could justify confinement within that reasonable removal period. Id. at 700.
Further, the Court recognized the Government's points that review must take "appropriate account of
the greater immigration-related expertise of the Executive Branch, of the serious administrative
needs and concerns inherent in the necessarily extensive INS efforts to enforce this complex statute,
and the Nation's need to 'speak with one voice' in immigration matters." Id.
132. Id. (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 651-52 (1990)).
133. Id.
deference.134 Thus, after the September 11, 2001 attacks, such a case could
be one where the Court would give the government the leeway for
preventive detention. The Court concluded that this necessary Executive
leeway will require difficult judgments, and to restrict the number of times
courts will have to make these decisions, the Court found it necessary to
recognize "some presumptively reasonable period of detention."''
35
In presuming a reasonable period of detention, the Court noted that an
argument could be made for restricting the presumption to ninety days, but
the Court doubted that when Congress adopted a ninety day removal period
in 1996, it thought that "all reasonably foreseeable removals" would be
successful in that time. 36 However, the Court stated that it had reason to
think that Congress had doubted whether detention for more than six months
was constitutional. 37 Thus, in order to ensure uniform administration in
federal courts, the Court held that the presumptive period of detention was
six months, and "[o]nce the alien provides good reason to believe that there
is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,
the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that
showing."'138  The Court further held that for the detention to remain
reasonable, the longer the alien has been detained in prior post-removal
confinement, the less likely removal in the "'reasonably foreseeable future"'
becomes. 39 The Court explained that its holding does not mean that every
alien not removed must be released after six months; rather, an alien may be
held in confinement until a determination has been made that there is "no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future."'
140
Thus, the majority concluded that when "[t]he Fifth Circuit held
Zadvydas' continued detention lawful as long as 'good faith efforts to
effectuate... deportation continue' and Zadvydas failed to show that
deportation will prove 'impossible,"' the circuit court used a standard which
seemed to require an alien seeking release to demonstrate the absence of any
chance of removal, regardless of how unlikely or unforeseeable, which the
Supreme Court held demanded more than its interpretation of the statute.' 4'
Further, the Supreme Court explained that when the Ninth Circuit required
Ma's release from detention because his removal in the foreseeable future
134. Id. at 691.
135. Id. at 700-01 (noting that the Court has "adopted similar presumptions in other contexts to
guide lower court determinations").
136. Id. at 701.
137. Id. (citing to Juris. Statement of United States in United States v. Witkovich, O.T. 1956, No.
295, pp. 8-9).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 702.
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was unlikely, its conclusion may have been based only on the lack of an
''extant or pending" repatriation agreement without giving appropriate
weight to possibly successful future negotiations.1 42 Thus, the Supreme
Court vacated the decisions below and remanded both cases for further
proceedings consistent with its opinion.
141
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy filed a dissent, which was joined in full by
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and in part by Justices Antonin Scalia
and Clarence Thomas. 44  Justice Kennedy explained that he dissented
because he believed that the Court "reached the wrong result for the wrong
reason." 145 Justice Kennedy explained how deeply he was disturbed by what
he interpreted as the majority's blatant and destructive overreaching. 4 6
Justice Kennedy thought that the Court's holding was "a serious
misconception of the proper judicial function, and it is not what Congress
enacted," and that "[t]he 6-month period invented by the Court, even when
modified by its sliding standard of reasonableness for certain repatriation
negotiations, makes the statutory purpose to protect the community
ineffective."'
' 47
The Justice raised an interesting point that a released alien may have
less incentive to cooperate or to help expedite removal, even if released on a
supervised basis, than does an alien detained at an INS facility because
neither the released alien nor his family would see the urgency in helping by
petitioning to other countries to accept the alien back, when the alien could
easily remain indefinitely in the United States. 48 While Justice Kennedy did
call the problems of the aliens "substantial," he nevertheless concluded
"[t]hat is not a reason, however, for framing a rule which ignores the law
governing alien status."'
49
Finally, Justice Kennedy pointed out that a removable alien "has no
right under the basic immigration laws to remain in this country," and
explained that "[t]he removal orders reflect the determination that the aliens'
ties to this community are insufficient to justify their continued presence in
the United States."'' 50 Justice Kennedy wrote that a condition of an alien's
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 705 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 706 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
146. See id.
147. Id. at 708, 725 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
148. Id. at 713 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 718 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 720 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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admission to the United States is compliance to our laws, and removal is the
consequence of a failure to comply.' 5' Justice Kennedy did acknowledge
that a removable alien has the right to be free from "arbitrary or capricious
detention," but he pointed out that detaining aliens when necessary to avoid
the risk of flight or danger to the community is neither arbitrary nor
capricious. 5 2 Justice Kennedy also pointed out that the theory that aliens
who have completed their prison terms are not a danger is not in harmony
with the reality that a substantial risk may remain, as evaluated using the
factors set forth in regulations. 53 In respect to the danger of aliens, Justice
Kennedy voiced concern regarding terrorists, stating that "[u]nderworld and
terrorist links are subtle and may be overseas, beyond our jurisdiction to
impose felony charges."' 5 4  The Justice found the majority's reasoning
regarding terrorists flawed. Justice Kennedy found the majority's position
that the release of terrorists or other special circumstances might justify
heightened deference to the political branches contradictory, as the Court
seemed to rely on an assessment of risk, but Justice Kennedy believed this
was the same premise the Court rejected when interpreting the natural
reading of the statute.' 55 Justice Kennedy concluded that the procedural
protection regarding detention "is real, not illusory; and the criteria for
obtaining release are far from insurmountable.' ' 56 Thus, Justice Kennedy
concluded that the burden is on the alien to prove that detention is no longer
justified, and he did not find this to be an unreasonable burden.'57
Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas
joined.' 58 While he agreed with the main dissent by Justice Kennedy that the
statute unambiguously gives the Attorney General the power to detain
criminal aliens for an unspecified time period, Justice Scalia wrote
separately to express his disapproval of Justice Kennedy's suggestion that
the courts may order an alien released from detention in certain cases.
159
151. Id.
152. Id. at 721 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that "[w]here detention is incident to removal, the
detention cannot be justified as a punishment nor can the confinement or its conditions be designed
in order to punish").
153. Id. at 714 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(f) (2001)).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 714-15 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 723 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 724 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that while the majority expressed concern that the
regulations place the burden on the alien to show he is no longer dangerous, that question could be
analyzed in a later case raising the issue). The Justice also pointed to statistics showing that between
February 1999 and mid-November 2000 about 6,200 aliens were provided custody reviews before
expiration of the 90-day removal period, and, of those aliens, about 3,380 were released. Id.
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing 65 Fed. Reg. 80,285 (Dec. 21, 2000); Reply Brief for Petitioners in
Ma at 15, Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (No. 00-38)).
158. Id. at 702 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
159. Id.
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Justice Scalia explained that a criminal alien ordered removed, but who
cannot be removed because no other country will accept him or her, is
asserting "a constitutional right of supervised release into the United States,"
and while "[t]his claim can be repackaged as freedom from 'physical
restraint' or freedom from 'indefinite detention,' . . . it is at bottom a claimed
right of release into this country by an individual who concededly has no
legal right to be here. There is no such constitutional right. 1 60 Justice Scalia
vehemently disagreed with the majority's distinction between resident and
excludable aliens, as he expressed that there was "no justification why an
alien under a valid and final order of removal - which has totally
extinguished whatever right to presence in this country he possessed - has
any greater due process right to be released into the country than an alien at
the border seeking entry., ' 16 1 According to Justice Scalia, Congress clearly
thought that both groups of aliens could be constitutionally detained on the
same terms, because it authorized the detention of both groups in the same
statutory provision. 62  Thus, because Justice Scalia thought the Court
incorrectly recognized this distinction, he found no constitutional obstacle to
Congress' award of discretion to the Attomey General.
63
IV. IMPACT
A. Judicial Impact and Hopes for a Legislative Impact
1. The Reaction of the Ninth Circuit
On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reissued, with an explicit clarification and specific
amendments, its prior ruling in Ma v. Reno.' 64 In this new opinion, the
Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the district court's finding that there was no
reasonable likelihood that the INS would be able to remove Ma to his home
country and once again found that the INS could not detain him any
160. Id. at 702-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
161. Id. at 704 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
162. Id. at 704-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 123 1(a)(6) (2001)).
163. Id. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164. 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated sub noma. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001),
amended sub non. Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2001).
longer.165 Judge Reinhardt, writing once again for the Ninth Circuit as he
did in Ma v. Reno, held that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) does not authorize the
indefinite detention of an alien ordered removed because Zadvydas
"essentially adopted the reasoning set forth in our opinion. '' 166 He pointed
out that the Court found that following the issuance of the final order of
removal, there is "a 'presumptively reasonable' period of six months during
which the INS may continue to detain an alien it is seeking to remove," but
that after that time, detention would be "lawful only if there is a 'significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future."", 167 In response
to the Court's remand order, Judge Reinhardt said that the Ninth Circuit was
now reissuing its earlier opinion with a clarification. 68 He stressed that the
panel's conclusion that it was not likely that Ma could be removed in the
reasonably foreseeable future "was based, and is based, not only on the fact
that there was no 'extant or pending' repatriation agreement but also on the
fact that there was an insufficient showing that future negotiations were
likely to lead to a repatriation agreement within the reasonably foreseeable
future."'
169
Judge Reinhardt explained that the panel had reached its conclusion
after a careful review of the record, including the findings of the district
court, which determined that the government's attempts to create a
repatriation agreement with Cambodia were merely "in an embryonic
stage.''7 ° Further, Judge Reinhardt said that the district court noted that the
U.S. government had not received a response from the Cambodian
government regarding its repatriation efforts, and that the United States
admitted that its ability to negotiate a repatriation agreement depended on
the status of ongoing similar negotiations with Vietnam.' 7' Judge Reinhardt
noted that the district court found that the U.S. government had held,
without any resolution, repatriation discussions with Vietnam for at least the
past four years and that two other judges in the same district had found that
these discussions with Vietnam offered no practical potential for success.
172
Thus, Judge Reinhardt said that the district court "concluded that there was
no 'realistic chance' that Ma would be removed and that this detention was
'indefinite.""73
Judge Reinhardt also clarified that the district court issued its ruling in
165. Ma v. Ashcrofl, 257 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2001).
166. Id. at 1098.
167. Id. (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701).
168. Id. at 1099.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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Ma on September 29, 1999, at which point Ma had already been detained for
more than eleven months after his final order of removal, which was well
after the six-month "presumptively reasonable" period the Supreme Court
established. 74 Therefore, the judge concluded that "[i]n our prior opinion,
we affirmed, and we reaffirm here, the District Court's finding that, under all
the circumstances, there was no likelihood of Ma's removal in the
foreseeable future."''
75
Judge Reinhardt then described in detail the specific modifications the
panel had made to its prior opinion in accordance with Zadvydas. These
changes primarily involved the inclusion of the six-month "presumptively
reasonable" period that the Court articulated in Zadvydas.7 6  Lastly, the
court of appeals repeated that its decision did "not leave the government
without remedies with respect to aliens who may not be detained
permanently while awaiting a removal that may never take place."' 7 7 The
court explained that all aliens ordered released, including Ma, must comply
with the "stringent" supervision requirements of § 1231 (a)(3), and any alien
involved in criminal activity during this time, including violating the
supervisory release conditions, can be "detained and incarcerated" as
provided for in the regular criminal process.' 78
In August 2002, in Guo Xi v. INS, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the
Supreme Court's ruling to apply to inadmissible aliens. 79 The circuit court
held that the statute had the same meaning for an alien deemed inadmissible
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182.80 The court stated that since the petitioner fell
within the statute and within the Supreme Court's opinion, the petitioner was
entitled to supervised release upon a showing that his removal to China in
the reasonably foreseeable future was unlikely.'' The court explained that
the statute applied to three classes of aliens: inadmissible aliens under §
1182, aliens ordered removed for certain violations, and aliens that pose a
risk to the community or are thought unlikely to obey the removal order.
82
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.at I115.
178. Id. Under these supervisory requirements, an alien must, among other things, appear before
an immigration officer regularly, provide information to that official, notify the INS of a change in
employment or residence within 48 hours, submit to medical and psychiatric testing, and comply
with travel restrictions. Id.
179. Guo Xi v. INS, 298 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2002).
180. Id. at 834 (stating that the analysis "begins and ends with Zadvydas").
181. Id.
182. Id. at 835.
The court explained that although Zadvydas fell into the second category of
aliens, the Supreme Court's ruling addressed the statute as a whole. 83 The
circuit court explained that the issue was clear, as the Supreme Court stated
that the statute "'applies to certain categories of aliens who have been
ordered removed, namely inadmissible aliens, criminal aliens, aliens who
have violated their nonimmigrant status conditions, and aliens removable for
certain national security or foreign relations reasons. '" 84  The court
reasoned that the statute's clear text, together with the Supreme Court's
"categorical interpretation," forced it to find that the opinion applies to
inadmissible aliens.' 85 The court also looked to Justice Kennedy's dissent
for support. 86  In his dissent, Justice Kennedy stated that it "'is not a
plausible construction of § 123 1(a)(6) to imply a time limit as to one class
[deportable aliens] but not to another [inadmissible aliens]. The text does
not admit this possibility."" 87  The court agreed with Justice Kennedy's
assessment that "'the majority's rule applies to both categories of aliens.""' 88
Perhaps sending a message to Congress, the circuit court stated that it
had the obligation to follow the Supreme Court's holding in Zadvydas, and
that its obligation was even more important because the Court interpreted a
statute that "Congress may change as it pleases."' 89 The circuit court noted
that if Congress desired divergent treatment for the categories of aliens, then
it could amend the statute. 90 The Ninth Circuit also emphasized that this
case did not present a national security situation or "'other special
circumstances where special arguments might be made for forms of
preventive detention."" 9' The court acknowledged the eerie coincidence
that only months after the Supreme Court coined this phrase, Congress
passed the legislation that authorized mandatory detention for suspected
terrorists.'92 The Ninth Circuit mentioned the legislation to emphasize the
scope of its holding, but the circuit court did not articulate an opinion on this
183. Id. (quoting the Supreme Court in Zadvydas that said "'we construe the statute to contain an
implicit "reasonable time" limitation, the application of which is subject to federal court review"').
184. Id. at 835-36 (emphasis added) (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001)).
185. Id. at 836 (noting that courts cannot make exceptions to provisions where the legislature
created none in the plain text). The court also explained that "'[i]t is [the Supreme Court's]
responsibility to say what a statute means, and once the Court has spoken, it is the duty of other
courts to respect that understanding of the governing rule of law."' Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1994)).
186. Id. at 837.
187. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 710 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
188. Id. (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 710 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
189. Id. at 839.
190. Id. (adding that the Amendment would be subject to constitutional considerations, but a
decision to alter the statute lies with the legislature, not the judiciary).
191. Id. (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696).
192. Id. This legislation is the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT). Id.
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legislation. 93 The Ninth Circuit concluded that Lin Guo Xi had spent more
than six months in detention and was entitled to demonstrate in federal court
that the United States could not remove him to China in the reasonably
foreseeable future.
94
2. The Reaction of the Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit had to rethink its "inconsistent" decision upon remand
from the Supreme Court, and did not issue its new opinion until March of
2002.'9' The circuit court reiterated the facts of Zadvydas' detention and the
relevant portions of the Supreme Court's opinion. The court noted that at
the time Zadvydas filed his habeas petition, he had been in INS custody for
more than six months after the termination of the removal period., 96 The
court also noted that at the time the district court rendered its decision,
Zadvydas had been in custody for more than three years after the removal
period had expired.' 97 After making these points, the circuit court stated that
it had considered the record, the previous opinions, and the Supreme Court's
opinion, which led it to conclude that Zadvydas had "'provided good reason
to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future."" 198  The court opined that the INS had failed to rebut
Zadvydas' showing, especially considering the Supreme Court's statement
that "as the period of prior post-removal confinement grows, what counts as
the 'reasonably foreseeable future' conversely would have to shrink."' 99 The
court stated that its prior decision was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
opinion and that the district court's prior order releasing Zadvydas was
correct.200 Thus, the circuit court withdrew its prior opinion and affirmed
the judgment of the district court.2 '
193. Id.
194. Id. at 840 (reversing and remanding to the district court for the factual determinations). The
Ninth Circuit has issued several opinions referencing Zadvydas. See, e.g., Valdivia v. INS, No. 00-
16884, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 7273 (9th Cir. Apr. 18, 2002); Navarro v. INS, No. 01-1511, 2002
U.S. App. LEXIS 6538 (9th Cir. Apr. 8, 2002); Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523 (9th Cir. 2002).
195. Zadvydas v. Davis, 285 F.3d 398 (5th Cir. 2002), vacated by 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
196. Id. at 404.
197. Id.
198. Id. (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701).
199. Id. (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701).
200. Id. The court also explained that the INS has never informed the court that Zadvydas is or
was a terrorist, that he posed a threat to national security, or that he violated any conditions of
release. Id. at 404 n.8.
201. Id. at 404. The court affirmed the opinion with the modification that the district court would
not prevent the INS from returning Zadvydas to INS custody based on a new showing of a
3. The Reaction of a District Court
In Yanez v. Holder, 02 the District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois acknowledged the Supreme Court's holding in Zadvydas, but noted
that "[u]nlike the statute at issue in [Zadvydas v.] Davis, the statute in the
present case clearly indicates congressional intent to grant the Attorney
General the authority to indefinitely confine an alien that is found deportable
by reason of being an aggravated felon. 2 °3  The court explained that
"section 1226(c) states that the Attorney General 'shall take into custody any
alien . . .' and allows the release of an alien described in the statute 'only if
the alien is part of the witness protection program. '20 4 Further, the court
pointed out that unlike § 1231, which uses the term "may" and gives
discretion to the Attorney General in making his or her determination of
release, the section at issue in this case "clearly mandates detention and
specifically states when release may take place., 20 5 In addition, the court
pointed out that unlike the alien in Zadvydas, in the instant case there was no
indication that there was no significant likelihood of removal of the aliens in
the reasonably foreseeable future, because there was no indication that the
aliens in the instant case could not be removed to another country. 206 The
court also acknowledged that, as the Supreme Court noted in Zadvydas,
aliens held under § 1226 have a "foreseeable detention termination point,"
and aliens held under § 1231 do not, thus the court held that Zadvydas did
not control the present case.20 7
substantial likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future or from modifying his release
conditions on the same basis. 1d. Over a year after the Supreme Court's decision in Zadvydas, this
is the only opinion issued by the Fifth Circuit citing Zadvydas, except for a citation in a concurring
opinion. See United States v. Johnston, 258 F.3d 361, 372 (5th Cir. 2001).
202. 149 F. Supp. 2d 485 (N.D. II1. 2001).
203. Id. at 494.
204. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2001)).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 494-95.
207. Id. at 495. Over a year later, the district courts in the Fifth Circuit have applied and followed
Zadvydas in four cases. See Lewis v. U.S. DOJ, No. 02-1190ST, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12893
(E.D. La. July 10, 2002); Serrano v. Estrada, 201 F. Supp. 2d 714 (N.D. Tex. 2002); Okwilagwe v.
INS, No. 3-01-CV-1416-BD, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3596 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 2, 2002); Malainak v.
INS, No. 3:01CV1989-P, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2002). In the last year,
district courts in the Fifth Circuit have distinguished Zadvydas in six cases. See Zheng v. INS, 207
F. Supp. 2d 550 (E.D. La. 2002); Vera v. Estrada, No. 3-01-CV-1044-X, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17790 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2001); Rollaro-Suarez v. Pratt, No. 3-01-CV-1419-G, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17764 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2001); Hemandez-Nodarse v. United States, 166 F. Supp. 2d 538
(S.D. Tex. 2001); Femandez-Fajardo v. INS, 193 F. Supp. 2d 877 (M.D. La. 2001); Beltran-Leonard
v. INS, No. 3:00CV2142-G, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14982 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2001). Over the last
year, district courts in the Ninth Circuit have cited to Zadvydas in seven cases. See Lema v. INS,
214 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (W.D. Wash. 2002); Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (C.D.
Cal. 2002); Khan v. Fasano, 194 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (S.D. Cal. 2001); Vanegas v. Smith, 179 F. Supp.
2d 1205 (D. Or. 2001); Singh v. Ashcroft, No. C 01-03920 WHA, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17895
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2001); Perez v. Demore, No. C 00-4628 CRB, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13763
796
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4. Dislocation in the Balance of Powers Between the Judicial and
Executive Branches?
As evidenced by the Ninth Circuit in Guo Xi and the district court in
Yanez, courts are now applying the reasoning of the Zadvydas decision and
are closely analyzing the intent of Congress. In his dissent, Justice Kennedy
opined that the Court had interpreted the statute with disregard of
congressional intent by creating a statutory amendment, and thus committed
a "grave constitutional error."2 °8  While the majority claimed to have
avoided a constitutional question as required by canons of statutory
construction, Justice Kennedy found that the ruling caused a "systematic
dislocation in the balance of powers" because the Court used the "guise of
judicial restraint" to intrude on the other branches. 20 9  This is a similar
criticism that the Ninth Circuit faced after it rendered its decision in the Ma
case. Many legal enthusiasts awaited the Ninth Circuit's ruling and were
disappointed by the circuit court's conclusion that the Attorney General
could not indefinitely detain the deportable aliens beyond the statutory
removal period if the removal could not be accomplished in the reasonably
foreseeable future. Arguing that the Ma court misconstrued the IIRIRA by
creating an exception to the discretion of the Attorney General, one writer
accused the circuit court of rewriting the plain language of the statute under
the guise of constitutional avoidance. 2 0 Acknowledging that constitutional
avoidance is proper when a statute is ambiguous, the author asserted that the
Ma case did not present such an opportunity because the IIRIRA clearly
allowed for detention after the removal period of criminal aliens who could
present a threat of danger or flight risk.21' Thus, the Supreme Court's
decision in Zadvydas leaves legal scholars to wonder whether the Court did
disrupt the balance of powers as Justice Kennedy postulated, or whether the
Court followed the assertion of Chief Justice Hughes, in NLRB v. Jones &
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2001); Hoa Cao v. INS, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (S.D. Cal. 2001).
208. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 705 (2001) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Court's error was giving the judicial branch the power to "summon high officers of the Executive to
assess their progress in conducting some of the Nation's most sensitive negotiations with foreign
powers" and possibly releasing hundreds of aliens that could present a flight risk or danger to the
community).
209. Id.
210. Matthew E. Hedberg, Kim Ho Ma v. Reno: Cloaking Judicial Activism as Constituiional
Avoidance, 76 WASH. L. REV. 669, 669-70 (2001) (arguing that the Ma court's statutory
interpretation was neither in harmony with the plain language of the statute, nor with the intent of
Congress).
211. Id. (finding that the circuit court "cloaked its activist decision in the chameleon-like
legitimacy of constitutional avoidance").
Laughlin Steel Corp., that "[t]he cardinal principle of statutory construction
is to save and not to destroy."2"2
Judges voiced concerns regarding the interpretation of laws and the
powers of the separate branches as early as 1825.213 A judge once wrote that
"the constitution may furnish a rule of construction, where a particular
interpretation of a law would conflict with some constitutional principle; and
such interpretation, where it may, is always to be avoided. 21 4 Furthermore,
he wrote that "the oath was more probably designed to secure the powers of
each of the different branches from being usurped by any of the rest; for
instance... [to prevent] the Supreme Court from attempting to control the
legislature., 21 5 To interpret statutes, courts mainly apply the plain-meaning
approach to remain true to the intent of Congress.1 6 As Justice Breyer
stated, if Congress' intent in the statute is "'clear, we must give effect to that
intent."'217 Following the plain-meaning approach requires a court to refrain
from altering the statute by reading words or elements into the language that
are not present on its face.2 " The Supreme Court has pointed out that it is
bound by the purpose of Congress as well as the means it chose to carry out
its purpose.21 9 An important tool for interpreting a statute is constitutional
avoidance, which is used to avoid constitutional questions when the plain
meaning of the statute or congressional intent is unclear.2 If the court does
212. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937).
213. Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330 (Pa. 1825).
214. Id. at 353 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 344-58 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
216. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[l]f the
language of a statute is clear, that language must be given effect - at least in the absence of a patent
absurdity."); see also RICHARD S. KAY ET AL., CONSTITUTIONALISM (Larry Alexander ed., 1998);
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42
STAN. L. REV. 321, 322 (1990) (arguing that "foundationalism is a flawed strategy for theorizing
about statutory interpretation and that a more modest approach, grounded upon 'practical reason,' is
both more natural and more useful"); Martin S. Flaherty, Symposium: The Cannon(s) of
Constitutional Law: Aim Globally, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 205 (2000) (containing an interesting
commentary on constitutional law in America).
217. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001) (quoting Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 336
(2000)).
218. Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29-30 (1997) (noting that when Congress includes
certain language in a section of a statute but excludes it from another section, it is generally
presumed that Congress did so intentionally and purposely).
219. MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 n.4 (explaining that
the Court and the FCC are both bound "not only by the ultimate purposes Congress has selected, but
by the means it has deemed appropriate, and prescribed, for the pursuit of those purposes.").
220. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. and Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (1988) (explaining that "where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would
raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems
unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress"). The Court noted that this
principle has been applied for so long that it is no longer possible to debate it. Id. The Court further
explained that "' [t]he elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in
order to save a statute fiom unconstitutionality' and that the approach reflects the concern that
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decide to engage in a constitutional inquiry regarding a statutory provision,
it is obliged to follow the "doctrine of severability," meaning that the court
should not invalidate more of a statute than is essential to eradicate its
"unconstitutional taint."'22' According to Justice Breyer, Zadvydas required
employing the tool of avoidance, as he argued that the Court could not find
"any clear indication of congressional intent to grant the Attorney General
the power to hold indefinitely in confinement an alien ordered removed. 22
The Court found the use of the word "may" in the statute as suggesting
discretion, but not necessarily unlimited discretion, and concluded that there
was nothing in the history of the statute that clearly indicated a
congressional intent to authorize indefinite and possibly permanent
detention.223
Traditional principles of immigration law led many court watchers and
Justice Kennedy to conclude that the Court should have deferred to the
judgment of Congress. It is a well-established axiom in immigration law,
and one acknowledged by the Court, that "the responsibility for regulating
the relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been
committed to the political branches of the Federal Government. 2 4 In fact,
constitutional issues should not be unnecessarily confronted and "also recognizes that Congress, like
this Court, is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution. The courts will therefore not
lightly assume that Congress intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power
constitutionally forbidden it." Id. (quoting Hooper v. Cooper, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)).
221. See Erika M. Anderson, A Man Without a Country: When the Inability to Deport Becomes a
Life Sentence, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 390, 405 (2001) (explaining that exceeding this limitation would
incorrectly frustrate the legislative intent underlying the statute, and thus the "doctrine of
severability" invalidates and eliminates the unconstitutional facets of the statute while rescuing the
force of the statute).
222. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695 (explaining that if Congress had meant to have authorized the
long-term detention of unremovable aliens it could have written the statute more clearly).
223. Id. at 695-98 (concluding that as a consequence, once removal is not reasonably foreseeable,
continued detention is not authorized by the statute). The Court pointed out that before 1952, lower
courts had interpreted the Immigration Act of 1917 to mean that deportation-related detention must
end within a reasonable time, and from the early 1950's to 1980's, the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 allowed, but did not require, post-deportation-order detention for up to six months. Id.
The Court explained that in early 1996, Congress then expanded the group of aliens subject to
mandatory detention and later that year Congress enacted the present law, which liberalized the past
law by shortening the removal period from six months to ninety days. Id.
224. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (explaining that because decisions in immigration
may involve relations with foreign powers, and because "a wide variety of classifications must be
defined in the light of changing political and economic circumstances, such decisions are frequently
of a character more appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive than to the Judiciary"); see
also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (stating that 'over no conceivable subject is the
legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over' the admission of aliens") (quoting
Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342
U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952) (finding that congressional apprehension of foreign or internal dangers
799
the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the IIRIRA includes many
provisions providing for judicial deference to the Executive's discretion. 225
However, as one writer pointed out, Congress' plenary power over
immigration "does not mean that Congress may ignore all constitutional
limitations when structuring the removal of aliens. 226  Justice Breyer
recognized this truism of immigration law and stated that the Court would
take account of the "greater immigration-related expertise of the Executive
Branch., 227 However, the Court concluded that courts are capable of taking
such matters into account without "abdicating their legal responsibility to
review the lawfulness of an alien's continued detention. 228  The Court
conceded that the executive branch has primacy in foreign policy matters,
which requires courts to carefully listen to the government's judgments
(including the status of repatriation negotiations) and requires the courts to
give the government proper leeway regarding its judgments based on its
foreign policy expertise.229  Appreciating that giving the executive branch
suitable leeway required making difficult judgments, the Court decided to
limit the occasions entailing them by recognizing a presumptively
reasonable period of detention.23° Since the Court found some evidence that
Congress doubted the constitutionality of detention beyond six months, and
to encourage uniform administration in federal courts, the Court recognized
the six-month period.23'
The approach the Court took could be referred to as "modern
avoidance," which entails that where an "'otherwise acceptable construction
short of war constitutes a valid basis for exercise of Congress' alien deportation powers). The Court
further explained that Supreme Court cases .'have long recognized the power to expel or exclude
aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments
largely immune from judicial control."' Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 (emphasis added) (quoting
Shaughncssy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953).
225. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1999) (stating
that "many provisions of IIRIRA are aimed at protecting the Executive's discretion from the courts -
indeed, that can fairly be said to be the theme of the legislation").
226. Gerald L. Neuman, Symposium: Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration
Act, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1963, 1990 (2000). The author concluded that attorneys and judges bear the
burden of reminding the government that its jurisdictional power has limits and to "reconcile a series
of statutory provisions with each other and with the Constitution." Id. at 1998.
227. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700 (continuing to explain that the Court would also take into account
the serious administrative needs and concerns of the effort by the INS to enforce the statute, as well
as the need of the Nation to "speak with one voice" on immigration matters).
228. Id. (explaining that typical principles of judicial review in immigration law acknowledge the
primary responsibility of the executive branch). The same principles also advise judges to give the
expert agencies leeway in decision-making regarding matters involving their expertise. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 700-01. The Court emphasized that it has adopted similar presumptions in other cases
in order to guide lower courts, and cited to Chqffv. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 379-80 (1966),
and County ofRiverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56-58 (1991). Id. at 701.
231. Id. (finding evidence of Congress' doubt in the Juris. Statement of United States in United
States %,. Witkovich, O.T. 1956, No. 295, pp. 8-9).
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of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems,"' the Court will
interpret the statute to avoid the problems unless that interpretation is clearly
21
contrary to Congress' intent.2 While the more traditional avoidance
employed by courts required the court to find that one possible interpretation
would be unconstitutional, modem avoidance only requires that the court
decide that one possible interpretation might be unconstitutional.233
Constitutional law professor Bernard James described the Court's
conclusion as a "classic statutory 'dance' of the type the Justices perform
when the intention of Congress is not clear., 234 Recognizing the plenary
power of Congress in the area, Professor James postulated that the Court "at
best - is providing a backdrop for future legislation on the subject. 'Clarity'
- if it comes to this provision in the INA Act-will come from Congress and
will likely involve codification of Part I of Justice Kennedy's dissent. 235
5. Will Congress Respond?
Many immigration attorneys are hoping that Congress will respond. A
statement released by the American Immigration Lawyers Association
acknowledged that the Supreme Court's decision was an important victory,
but also emphasized that "only Congress can ensure that our laws do not
allow the same or similar injustices to occur to other immigrants. 236 Judy
Rabinovitz, senior staff counsel for the Immigrants Rights Project of the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), suggested that the Supreme
Court's decision might force Congress' hand, as the ruling "really put the
spotlight on immigrant detention.2 37 Congress might also be motivated to
232. Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1949 (1997) (quoting Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
233. Id. (noting that the traditional and modem approaches correspond to what have been referred
to as narrow and broad approaches and citing to Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious
Constitutional Doubts: The Supreme Court's Construction of Statutes Raising Free Speech
Concerns, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. I (1996)).
234. E-mail from Bernard James, Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law, to
Megan Peitzke, student, Pepperdine University School of Law (Nov. 8, 2001, 10:43 PST) (on file
with author).
235. Id. Professor James specializes in constitutional law and has served as the First Amendment
contributing editor of the ABA Preview Journal, which reviews U.S. Supreme Court cases. He
writes for the National Law Journal regarding First Amendment issues and lectures in the United
States and Canada on constitutional material. He also serves as a commentator for the national and
local media to discuss decisions of the Supreme Court. More information on Professor James is
available at http://law.pepperdine.edu/campcom/faculty/ames/.
236. Daniel C. Vock, U.S. Should Follow High Court Ruling on Aliens, Lawyers Say, CHI. DAILY
L. BULL., July 20, 2001, at 1.
237. Larry Margasak, Court Nixes Open-Ended Jail Terms, ASsOCIATED PRESS, June 28, 200 1,
respond due to embarrassment or anger that an area of law that it has
enjoyed such broad power over was infringed on or usurped by the judiciary.
In fact, one legal scholar said that the Court was "'defying the will of
Congress.' ' 238 Another writer interpreted the Court's ruling as having "sent
a clear message to Congress and the executive branch that there are limits to
their power to control immigration even when anti-immigration sentiment
runs high., 239 Further, a legal scholar accused the Court of "'creating all
sorts of substantive due process rights for aliens not thought to exist
before.' 240 Georgetown University law professor Alex Aleinikoff, formerly
of INS general counsel, seemed to agree that the case changed immigration
law, as he pointed out that in the last one hundred years "the [C]ourt has said
Congress has full power in immigration law. This decision implies that...
we apply the same standard to immigrants as to U.S. citizens., 24' However,
others, like attorney George A. Cumming, Jr., who filed an amicus brief
supporting the aliens on behalf of a number of immigration law professors,
thought that there was "a lot of deference even in this opinion to the primacy
of the political branches., 242  Lucas Guttentag, director of the ACLU's
Immigrants Rights Project, asserted that the ruling sent an "unmistakable
message to Congress that it went too far in 1996" and that "Congress should
now heed the [C]ourt's message and repeal the remainder of the 1996 laws
that compel the detention and deportation of immigrants who have
committed minor crimes. '243  It has been reported that Congress was
considering legislation before September 11, 2001 that would have relaxed
restrictions that it had imposed by the IIRIRA; however, after the terrorist
attacks, it is possible that non-citizens will face an even tougher time.
244
available at 2001 WL 24030154.
238. Id. (quoting Richard Samp of the conservative Washington Legal Foundation, who also said
that Congress had "'changed the law in 1996 to tighten up restrictions on criminal aliens' and the
Court had used the case to "'rewrite the laws in a manner that was more favorable to immigrants
than prior laws'). In another article, Richard Samp advocated that the Court had "'greatly
expanded the ... rights of aliens, saying they have the same ones as citizens' and it was "'kind of a
slap in the face of Congress."' Charles Lane & Hanna Rosin, Court Limits Detention of Immigrants:
Justices Rule Convicts Can't Be Held Indefinitely, WASH. POST, June 29, 2001, at A 1.
239. Marcia Coyle, Court Trims Congress'Sails on Immigrants, NAT'L L.J., July 9, 2001, at Al.
240. Id. (quoting Richard Samp of the conservative Washington Legal Foundation).
24 I. Charles Lane & Hanna Rosin, Court Limits Detention of Inmigrants: Justices Rule Convicts
Can't Be Held Indefinitely, WASH. POST, June 29, 2001, at A l.
242. Marcia Coyle, Court Trims Congress' Sails on Immigrants, NAT'L L.J., July 9, 2001, at Al
(quoting George A. Cumming, Jr. of San Francisco's Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, who disagreed
with the dissenters in the case and thought that the majority's "significant likelihood" test would not
be too hard for courts to apply).
243. Press Release, ACLU, In Second Victory for Immigrants' Rights, High Court Says INS
Cannot Indefinitely Jail Immigrants (June 28, 2001), available at
http://www.aclu.org/lmmigrantsRights/ImmigrantsRights.cfm?ID=7339&c=95&Type=s. Lucas
Guttentag also argued the judicial review cases that the Supreme Court heard. Id.
244. Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-loehr, As the World Turns: Immigration Law Before and
After Sept. 11,226 N.Y. L.J. 3 (2001).
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Whether or not Congress heard the message and will amend or repeal the
Act still remains to be seen, but after the passage of the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT) Act, the detention of
immigrants after September 11, 2001, and the alleged usurpation of
Congress' plenary power, it is more probable than not that Congress will act.
B. Social Impact
1. The Immediate Effects of the Court's Decision in Zadvydas
As Judy Rabinovitz explained it, the Court's ruling "casts doubt on all
sorts of INS detention practices and gives hope to thousands of immigrants
and legal residents. 245  Jayashri Srikantiah, an ACLU attorney who
represented Ma in district court, feels that the Court's ruling is a "profound
reminder that the constitutional right to freedom from detention applies to
citizens and non-citizens alike. 2 46  The impact of the Supreme Court's
decision emerged as quickly as August of 2001, when the INS announced it
had released 359 foreign nationals who were not considered dangerous to the
community, but who were released under strict conditions of supervision in
order to comply with the ruling.247 Disturbingly enough, it has been reported
that U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft has said that "most of the 3,400
detainees eligible for release under the [C]ourt ruling would not be freed. 248
Further, in response to the Supreme Court's decision, the Department of
Justice formally invoked its statutory authority and required the Secretary of
State to cease issuing visas to Guyanese citizens, subjects, nationals and
residents because of that country's failure to accept the return of nationals
whose deportation has been ordered. 249  The Department of Justice also
245. Press Release, ACLU, In Second Victory for Immigrants' Rights, High Court Says INS
Cannot Indefinitely Jail Immigrants (June 28, 2001), available at
http://www.aclu.org/lmmigrantsRights/lmmigrantsRights.cfm?ID=7339&c=95&Type=s. According
to Rabinovitz and the ACLU, there are more than 3,000 nationally who are similarly situated to Ma.
Id.
246. Id. (explaining that it does not make sense to punish people by locking them up for life
simply because they cannot return home).
247. Ruling Leads to INS Detainees' Release, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 6, 2001, available at
2001 WL 26177011. The Miami Herald reported that Cuban convicts and asylum seekers will
remain in custody because the Supreme Court's decision does not extend to them (most, about 1,700,
are Cuban detainees that arrived during the Mariel boatlift and were later convicted), and they
remain in detention because they are not part of the 1984 repatriation agreement between Cuba and
the United States that allowed 2,746 Cubans to be repatriated. Id.
248. Id.
249. Press Release, Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of
803
responded to the Court's decision by publishing an interim rule in the
Federal Register that amended the INS' procedures governing the review
process of aliens subject to a final order of removal or deportation. 5°
Although the Department created the interim rule to comply with the criteria
set forth in Zadvydas, the rule also allows for the INS to detain aliens who
are not reasonably likely to be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future
under special circumstances, such as terrorism concerns.2  While legal
scholars and immigrants disturbed by Ashcroft's reported remarks await the
reaction of Congress to Zadvydas, the ACLU and a group of civil rights
advocates, religious leaders, immigrants' rights activists, and labor
organizations are seeking passage of the Immigrant Fairness Restoration Act
of 2001, which would reform INS detention practices for all immigrants and
ensure that immigration laws "do not change the rules in the middle of the
game.,
252
2. The Bigger Picture: Immigration Law Before and After September
11 th
Before September 11, 2001, the Supreme Court rendered two decisions
that seemed to protect immigrants. In INS v. St. Cyr,253 the Court disagreed
with the INS' application of the deportation provisions of the IIRIRA.
While the INS argued that the IIRIRA took away its discretion to waive the
deportation of long-time permanent residents even for earlier convictions,
the Court disagreed. The Court held that the IIRIRA did not deprive a court
of jurisdiction to review an alien's habeas petition, and that provisions of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the IIRIRA,
which repealed discretionary relief from deportation, did not apply
Justice Imposes Sanctions on Government of Guyana for Refusing to Accept Repatriation of Its
Citizens, (Sept. 7, 2001), available at 2001 WL 1039657.
250. Continued Detention of Aliens Subject to Final Orders of Removal, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,967
(Nov. 14, 2001) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 3 & 241); see also Press Release, Department of
Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service, Justice Department Implements Zadvydas v. Davis
Supreme Court Decision (Nov. 14, 2001), available at 2001 WL 1432070.
251. Press Release, Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service, Justice
Department Implements Zadvydas v. Davis Supreme Court Decision (Nov. 14, 2001), available at
2001 WL 1432070. Section 241.14(d) mandates that the INS "shall continue to detain an alien
whose release would pose a significant threat to the national security or a significant risk of
terrorism." Continued Detention of Aliens Subject to Final Orders of Removal, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,973
(Nov. 14, 2001) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 3 & 241) (emphasis added). The rule in its entirety
can be found at http://www.access.gpo.gov.
252. Press Release, ACLU, In Second Victory for Immigrants' Rights, High Court Says INS
Cannot Indefinitely Jail Immigrants (June 28, 2001), available at
http://www.aclu.org/ImmigrantsRights/ImmigrantsRights.cfm?ID=7339&c=95&Type=s; see also
Letter from Laura W. Murphy & Timothy H. Edgar, Director and Legislative Counsel of the ACLU
respectively, to Edward M. Kennedy, United States Senator (May 21, 2001), available at
http://www.aclu.org/lmmigrantsRights/ImmigrantsRights.cfm?ID=280&c=95.
253. 533 U.S. 289(2001).
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retroactively to the respondent, who had pled guilty to the indictment before
Congress enacted the statute.5 The Supreme Court later rendered the
Zadvydas decision, which extended the protection of immigrants, but the
Court also included the "special circumstance exception." As one writer
pointed out: "Despite having taken important steps toward recognizing the
individual rights of aliens living within U.S. borders, the Court continues to
preserve exceedingly broad discretion for Congress and the Executive on
immigration matters. A close reading of the Court's opinion in Zadvydas
uncovers deferential language that inadequately protects detainees. 255
Congress also acted several times during 2000 and 2001 to create a more
flexible immigration policy, such as increasing the annual number of aliens
allowed temporary status for working in a specialty occupation and allowing
certain prospective immigrants entry into the U.S. under temporary status
while they awaited processing of their permanent residency applications.
256
Unfortunately, after September 11, 2001, the protection of immigrants
and especially of resident aliens has diminished. The aforementioned
interim rule published by the Department of Justice in reaction to the
Zadvydas ruling provides great leeway for the government to detain
"suspected terrorists," rationalized as a "special circumstance" as the Court
suggested. 7 The interim rule explains that in any case where the basis of
254. Id. at 308-15 (explaining that because the respondent entered a guilty plea prior to the
enactment of the statute, he became subject to deportation, and he became eligible for a discretionary
waiver of that deportation pursuant to the prevailing interpretation of § 212(c)). Similar to its
decision in Zadvydas, the Court placed great emphasis on the need for Congress to express its intent
clearly, explaining that "when a particular interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of
Congress' power, [the Court] expect[s] a clear indication that Congress intended that result." Id. at
300. In absence of such intent, the Court is obligated to interpret the statute to avoid constitutional
problems. Id.
255. Plight of the Tempest-Tost: Indefinite Detention of Deportable Aliens, 115 HARV. L. REV.
1915, 1917 (2002).
256. Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-loehr, As the World Turns: Immigration Law Before and
After Sept. 11,226 N.Y. L.J. 3 (2001) (pointing out that the administrations of George W. Bush and
Vicente Fox joined together to promote a safer stream of migrants across the border by creating an
improved program for temporary workers); see also Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-loehr, New
Law: Higher H-IB Visa Numbers, Fewer INS Delays, 224 N.Y. L.J. 78 (2000); Stephen Yale-loehr,
Christina Sherman, Christoph Hoashi-Erhardt, & Brian Palmer, T, U and V Visas: More Alphabet
Soup for Immigrant Practioners, 6 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 113 (2001).
257. Continued Detention of Aliens Subject to Final Orders of Removal, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,972
(Nov. 14, 2001) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 3 & 241) (explaining that the rule has been written to
allow for continued detention when there is not a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future in four situations, one of which is national security and terrorism concerns). In
addition, the INS passed an interim regulation at the request of the Attorney General that extended
the period that the INS could detain an alien while deciding whether to file charges or not from
twenty-four to forty-eight hours. See Suzanne Gamboa, INS Changes Rules on Immigration,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 18, 2001, available at 2001 WL 27338054 (quoting Jeanne Butterfield,
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the alien's final order for removal is unrelated to terrorism or national
security, an immigration officer will interview the alien, who may have legal
representation and present any relevant evidence on his or her behalf2 5 8 The
Department of Justice continued to explain that this situation will arise if an
alien is ordered removed for overstaying a student visa and the government
has information indicating that the alien's release would present a
"significant threat to the national security or a significant risk of
terrorism. 2 59  The rule provides that based on the Commissioner's
recommendation and the recommendation of the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Attorney General personally decides whether to
certify that the alien should not be released because he or she poses a
significant threat to national security or a risk of terrorism. 260  The rule
acknowledges that detention based on suspected terrorism requires a
"predictive judgment" based upon past or present conduct and a wide variety
of circumstances; thus the Attorney General is in the best position to assess
an alien's due process interests and weigh them against national security
concerns. 26' The Department of Justice concluded that the Attorney General
should have the "personal responsibility" to make the final decision to detain
the alien beyond the presumptively reasonable six month period based on
terrorism concerns because of his relationship with the intelligence
community and based on the "broad delegation of discretionary authority"
that Congress granted the Attorney General in the Act.262
With the publication of its interim rule, the Department of Justice laid
the foundation for detaining aliens under the category of release presenting a
risk of terrorism. While it is not possible to know whether the group of 548
aliens detained by the Department of Justice on immigration charges after
the terrorist attacks includes resident aliens who have been ordered deported,
because the Department will not release the list of detainees, the attacks have
definitely impacted immigrants in general and possible future court cases.263
American Immigration Lawyers Association executive director, who found the new period
reasonable, but cautioned, "As to what is reasonable beyond that, we need to exercise some caution
[and] [o]bviously the slippery slope here is indefinite detention").
258. Continued Detention of Aliens Subject to Final Orders of Removal, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,973
(Nov. 14, 2001) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 3 & 241).
259. Id.
260. Id. (explaining that the rule also provides that prior to certification, the Attorney General
must order any further hearings or review proceedings as appropriate under the circumstances).
261, Id. (concluding that the Department included the provisions for continued detention because
cases may arise where the Attorney General finds that it would be irresponsible to release the alien
awaiting removal from detention "because the release would result in serious damage to the national
security or pose an imminent threat of terrorism").
262, Id.
263. Attorney General Ashcroft, Speech on the Total Number of Federal Criminal Charges and
INS Detainees (Nov. 27, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2001/
agcrisisremarksl I_27.htm. The Attorney General pointed out that the amount of 548 detainees
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A Washington attorney who practices before the Supreme Court summarized
the change before and after September 11 when he stated that, "it is
inconceivable that the case would come out the same way today .... Any
focus by the [C]ourt on civil liberties ... may be sharply curtailed as the
[J]ustices give more deference to government officials. '2 64 A comment by
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor may indicate he is right, as she
explained that after the attacks "we're likely to experience more restrictions
on our personal freedom than has ever been the case before. 2 65 Immigrants
of all types face the greatest threat to their personal liberties, as the Attorney
General proclaimed that the "Department of Justice is waging a deliberate
campaign of arrest and detention to protect American lives. 2 66  The
Attorney General also stated that it would "use every constitutional tool to
keep suspected terrorists locked up., 267  In response to the Department's
deliberate campaign of arrest and detention, the ACLU joined twenty-two
organizations in filing suit on December 5, 2001 against the Department of
Justice.268 The organizations filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
suit in an attempt to have a court order the Department to release documents
relating to the detainees because the groups believe that the government has
already decided that most of the detainees are not connected to terrorism,
and there is no longer a national security rationale for withholding
information. 69  Also, the Center for Constitutional Rights is preparing a
class-action suit on behalf of detainees based on claims of deprivation of
liberty, violations of due process, and other claims regarding the conditions
of the jailhouses.270 Considering that the Supreme Court suggested only that
the INS could continue to detain a certain category of aliens in special
suspected of terrorism does not seem so large a number when one considers that the INS currently
has 20,000 people in detention awaiting deportation. Id.
264. Lyle Denniston, Detentions in Terror Probe May Reach Supreme Court, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 30, 2001, at A9.
265. Id.
266. Attorney General Ashcroft, Speech on the Total Number of Federal Criminal Charges and
INS Detainees (Nov. 27, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2001/
agcrisisremarksl I_27.htm. The Attorney General elaborated that the Department was removing
"suspected terrorists who violate the law" in order to prevent terrorist attacks in the future, and
announced that it had "al Qaeda membership" in custody. Id.
267. Id.
268. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. Dep't of Justice, No. 01-2500 (D.D.C. Dec. 5, 2001), available
at http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/01-2500.pdf.
269. Id. (noting that on October 25, 2001, the Attorney General announced that the "anti-terrorism
offensive ha[d] arrested or detained nearly 1,000 individuals as part of the September II terrorism
investigation").
270. Jim Edwards, Rights Organizations Document Cases of "Indefinite" N.J. Detention of
Aliens, N.J. L.J., Mar. 18, 2002, at 3.
circumstances like terrorism, it is likely that the Court will have to set rules
for when other immigrants, like the 548 in INS custody, can be continuously
detained, and it will have to decide whether the Attorney General used
constitutional tools or not. However, until those rules are clarified, people
like Mohammed Nofal serve as a prediction of the fate that may await the
recent detainees. Nofal is a Palestinian who is stateless and has been in jail
for four and one-half years waiting to be deported.27' One immigration
specialist explained that "[t]he people who will be in trouble are from the
countries with which INS has had great trouble repatriating their citizens., 272
Perhaps Nofal himself captured the impact of September 1 th best when he
said, "'When I heard about the case, I thought, "Thank God, I won't have to
die here." But nothing has changed.' 273
Besides the special circumstances exception carved out in the Zadvydas
decision and the Department of Justice's interim rule, the PATRIOT Act
also affects immigrants of all types. A main criticism offered by civil rights
groups is that section 412, which amends the INA, allows for the indefinite
detention of immigrants and other non-citizens.274 This section allows
detention on the Attorney General's finding of "reasonable grounds to
believe" that there is involvement in terrorism or activity exists which poses
a danger to national security, and provides for a so-called "limit" on
indefinite detention by stating that detention may continue for additional
periods of up to six months only if a determination is made that the alien
threatens national security or the safety of the community. 275 Civil rights
groups are not the only ones concerned, as one writer expressed that "the
Patriot Act, approved since the terrorist attacks, allows Attorney General
John Ashcroft to detain indefinitely foreigners who are certified as
endangering national security., 276  Lucas Guttentag, director of the
271. For Some, Deportation Takes Years, DESERET NEWS, Dec. 10, 2001, at A2, available at
2001 WL 31227652.
272. Id. (quoting Chris Nugent of the American Bar Association's Immigration Pro Bono Project).
273. Id. (quoting Mohammed Nofal). The Article also quotes public defender Jay Stansell, who
represented a client from Afghanistan before September II whom the INS claims it can repatriate, as
saying, "'It's been less than a year since the Zadvydas case, but it seems like we're moving toward
more indefinite detention, not less."' Id. (quoting Jay Stansell).
274. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT) Act of 2001, H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. § 412 (2001). Section
412 states in its entirety, "In general - The Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.)
is amended by inserting after section 236 the following . I..." ld.
275. Id. Section 236(a)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides a limit on indefinite
detention by stating that an "alien detained solely under paragraph (I) who has not been removed
under section 241(a)(l)(A), and whose removal is unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future, may
be detained for additional periods of up to six months only if the release of the alien will threaten the
national security of the United States or the safety of the community or any person."
276. For Some, Deportation Takes Years, DESERET NEWS, Dec. 10, 2001, at A2, available at
2001 WL 31227652 (emphasis added) (pointing out that some detainees may be held even though
Zadvydas would have otherwise limited their detention). The United States has decided to treat the
808
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Immigrants Rights Project for the ACLU, explained that the legislation
allows detention based on mere suspicion and that the "detention would be
mandatory, and the detention could be indefinite." '277
Concerns over the changes in immigration law and the increase in
detentions of immigrants have led to numerous individuals testifying in
Congress. Joseph Greene and Edward McElroy of the INS testified in
December of 2001 to present a review of the immigration detention
policies. 278 The testimony indicated concern with requiring mandatory
detention in statutes like the IIRIRA because it requires the INS to detain a
much larger number of people.27 9 For example, from the fiscal year 1994 to
fiscal year 2001, the average daily detention population more than tripled
from 5,532 to 19,533.280 In the fiscal year 2000, the INS admitted more than
188,000 aliens into detention, and between the fiscal years of 1991 and
2001, the average population of criminal aliens removed by the INS more
than doubled from 32,512 to 70,873.281 The new legislation also prompted
Harvard law professor Laurence H. Tribe to testify in December of 2001 that
Congress should be involved in the national effort to defeat global terrorism
"without inadvertently succumbing to our own reign of terror., 28 2 Similar to
the distinction the Supreme Court pointed out in Zadvydas that the choice
was "not between imprisonment and the alien 'living at large,' 28 3 Professor
Tribe pointed out that the choice we face after September 11 th is not "liberty
,,284versus security. Professor Tribe advised Congress to have the "wisdom
detainees captured in war as "unlawful combatants" rather than prisoners of war; however, Britain
refused to follow the Unites States' lead and treats the detainees as prisoners of war. See British
Forces to Treat Detainees as POWs, L.A. TIMES, April 30, 2002, at 4. The United States has
hundreds of prisoners in indefinite detention who have not been charged, and "some may be tried in
military tribunals." Id.
277. Interview by CNN with Lucas Guttentag, Director, ACLU Immigrants Rights Project (Oct.
17, 2001), available at http://www.cnn.com/200/COMMUNITY/O0/I 7/guttentag/index.html.
278. A Review of Department of Justice Immigration Detention Policies: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 21 (2001)
(statement of Joseph Greene, Acting Deputy Executive Associate Commissioner, Field, and Edward
McElroy, District Director, INS).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Review of Terrorism Suspect Policies: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th
Cong. (2001) (statement of Laurence H. Tribe, Professor of Constitutional Law at Harvard
University School of Law).
283. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001).
284. Review of Terrorism Suspect Policies: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th
Cong. (2001) (statement of Laurence H. Tribe, Professor of Constitutional Law at Harvard
University School of Law).
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and courage" to avoid the terrible mistake that the government and the
courts made when they ratified and ordered the detention of over 70,000
Japanese-Americans in internment camps during World War II.285 In
Koremnatsu v. United States,2 86 the Supreme Court allowed the government
to place American citizens in internment camps solely on the grounds of
their ancestry, which they justified as preserving national security. 87
Professor Tribe explained to Congress that, "[w]e are at the 'Korematsu'
crossroads. Congress can determine which path we take. And Congress has
a special responsibility to act., 288  The resident aliens affected by the
Zadvydas decision would also be affected by President Bush's Military
Tribunal Order of November 13, 2001, as the Professor explained that it is a
"direct threat to some 20 million lawful resident aliens in the United States.
Almost any act by a resident alien, anywhere, could in some circumstances
lead the President to believe the alien has or had some form of involvement
with a terrorist organization. '28 9  Robert A. Levy, a senior fellow in
constitutional studies at the Cato Institute, called the Bush military tribunal
order "illegitimate., 290  Mr. Levy took offense to the Attorney General's
accusation that those who disagreed with the order were "'giving
ammunition to America's enemies,' 'aiding terrorists,' or 'eroding our
national unity.' ' 29 1 Mr. Levy countered that the opposition to the military
tribunal order is "upholding the Constitution; securing the values that sustain
a free society; and, at the same time, preserving for the president the option
285. Id.
286. 323 U.S. 214(1944).
287. Id.; see also Review of Terrorism Suspect Policies: Hearing Befbre the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Laurence H. Tribe, Professor of Constitutional Law at
Harvard University School of Law).
288. Id. Professor Tribe also testified that the freedoms we enjoy are embodied in the
Constitution as are "our security against the fanatics' new tyranny of terror. To assert them here is
to win at home the war we are waging so effectively abroad." Id. Professor Tribe also did not agree
with President Bush's Military Tribunal Order of November 13, 2001, referring to it as having
"constitutional infirmities that plague" it, and arguing that avoiding those infirmities would not only
protect the rights of those threatened by the Order, but would also protect any consequential
convictions from being reversed later on appeal. Id. Other congressional testimony provides
evidence of serious constitutional concerns regarding President Bush's Military Tribunal Order. See
Review of Terrorism Suspect Policies: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong.
(2001) (statement of Timothy Lynch, Director, Project on Criminal Justice, Cato Institute).
289. Review of Terrorism Suspect Policies: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th
Cong. (2001) (statement of Laurence H. Tribe, Professor of Constitutional Law at Harvard
University School of Law) (explaining that the resident alien could be unaware that he or she is
involved with terrorists because "[a]ll that is required is 'aid[ing] or abet[ing]' terrorists or 'acts in
preparation []for' terrorism," thus, hiring a car for an acquaintance who turns out to be a terrorist
could make one subject to a military tribunal). Professor Tribe also cited the Zadvydas opinion in
his testimony to explain that its protection did not extend to aliens outside the United States, so,
consequently, there may be no alternative to their indefinite detention by the United States at a
"suitable place outside our borders, unless and until their repatriation becomes possible." Id.
290. Robert A. Levy, Not on Our Soil, NAT'L REV., Jan. 25, 2002, at 4.
291. Id. (quoting the Attorney General).
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of using military tribunals outside of the United States - where they
belong. '292 Further, law professor Margaret H. Taylor of Wake Forest
University explained to Congress in her testimony that mandatory detention
under INA, or the "lock 'em all up" approach as she calls it, strains the INS'
resources and violates due process because it does not allow an immigration
judge to make case-by-case determinations based on individual facts.293
Professor Taylor conveyed to Congress her concerns that "hundreds of post-
9/11 detainees from the Middle East, who have been cleared of any possible
involvement in terrorism but are nevertheless are [sic] being held for minor
visa violations, are the most recent example of individuals who are being
detained as part of a symbolic 'crackdown." 294  Professor Taylor also
supported the view that the PATRIOT Act raises grave constitutional
questions.295 One constitutional scholar summarized the concerns about law
during wartime best when he stated, "emergency circumstances sometimes
require emergency solutions. Still, the Constitution applies in both peace
and war.,2 9
6
One legal writer has stood out among the other critics and endorsed
Attorney General Ashcroft's actions. Griffin Bell of the Wall Street Journal
not only found the actions lawful, but also asserted that for the Attorney
General to have done any less would have been irresponsible.97 Bell, a
former U.S. Attorney General under President Carter, argued that the arrests
and detentions assaulted by other legal scholars were not "preventive" at all,
but rather were actions taken for independent valid reasons which were
authorized by the Constitution and federal law before September I I th.295
However, Bell conceded that in some facets the detentions were
"preventive," as they were used in "unprecedented numbers to thwart further
terrorist attacks.2 99  Bell recognized that the new provisions of the INA
292. Id.
293. A Review of Department of Justice Immigration Detention Policies: Hearing Beiore the
Suhcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the House Conn. on the Judicia,, 107th Cong. 21 (200 1)
(statement of Margaret H. Taylor, Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law).
294. Id. (noting that we should not deprive people of their liberties in order to send a message).
295. Id. (explaining that the interim rule regarding custody procedures issued on September 17,
2001 extends the time for the INS to decide charging and custody matters to forty-eight hours); see
also Custody Procedures, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,334, 48,335 (Sept. 20, 2001) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt.
287). Also, the PATRIOT Act allows for detention of a certified alien to a maximum of seven days
before charges must be filed. Id.
296. Robert A. Levy, Not on Our Soil, NAT' REv., Jan. 25, 2002, at 2.
297. Griffin Bell, Ashcrofi Is Right to Detain Suspects in Terror Probe, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17,
200 1, at A18.
298. Id.
299. Id. (noting that the Zadvi'das decision acknowledged terrorism as a special circumstance
allow for the "indefinite detention of suspected terrorists" pending criminal
or removal proceedings, but thought that they fall within the
administration's discretion in fighting terrorism.3°° Bell seemed to diverge
from the critics in his analysis by placing the emphasis on the need for
preventive detention, rather than on the importance of protecting civil
liberties even at war. Bell concluded that as long as the detainees "have
access to counsel, and are treated fairly and with respect, 'preventive
detentions' are a legitimate part of the administration's efforts to preserve
America's freedom from fear."' ' Whether the actions taken by the Attorney
General and the Bush Administration are fair or legitimate is a question that
the Supreme Court will eventually face.
V. CONCLUSION
For the time being, stateless aliens such as Mohammed Nofal will have
to continue to wait. The INS says that it has reviewed Nofal's file and that
his past convictions for possessing cocaine and buying marijuana "[make]
him a possible community risk and unsuitable for release."3 °2 While most
people would not expect this to inspire or comfort stateless resident aliens
like Nofal, a spokeswoman for the INS claims that the Agency has recently
released people from Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Jordan after long periods
of detention, even after the terrorist attacks.30 3 As most of these aliens are
placed in remote county jails that the INS contracts with in order to deal
with the mandatory detention requirement, Nofal and similarly situated
aliens can only hope that the INS is making progress and he will not be left
"'in the middle of nowhere ... lost to the world.' 30
4
As one writer explained the status of immigration law and detained
immigrants prior to the Zadvydas decision, "[p]rolonged imprisonment is not
justice," and the United States Supreme Court has the occasion to "translate
liberty and justice into reality for all. It can interpret the law in light of the
Constitution and release indefinitely detained aliens, like Kim Ho Ma. This
interpretation of individual rights echoes the constitutional refrain that
pledges allegiance to the protection of all individuals. 3 5  While some
which may allow for preventive detention).
300. Id. (noting that even in this area, the actions of the Justice Department are subject to judicial
review, and all detainees see a judicial officer after being taken into custody).
301. Id. (emphasis added).
302. For Some, Deportation Takes Years, DESERET NEWS, Dec. 10, 2001, at A2, available at
2001 WL 31227652.
303. Id. INS spokeswoman Karen Kraushaar elaborated that people who can prove they are not a
threat to public safety and will comply with their conditions of release qualify for release. Id.
304. Id. (quoting Mary Meg McCarthy, a lawyer at the Midwest Immigrant and Human Rights
Center in Chicago).
305. Erika M. Anderson, A Man Without a Country: When the Inability to Deport Becomes a Life
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Americans may fear that the Court is allowing the release of violent
criminals or terrorists with this ruling, that is not the case, as evidenced by
the factors to be reviewed before release and by the "special circumstances"
exception. As the Ninth Circuit pointed out, about seventy percent of lawful
permanent resident aliens affected by this decision are admitted because they
have family in the United States.30 6 The court pointed out that the members
are either citizens or permanent resident aliens.30 7 The court also explained
that next largest group of permanent resident aliens are "highly educated or
exceptionally skilled professionals who can contribute in important ways to
the educational institutions and economy of the United States. 30 8 In fact,
the reality is more often the opposite of the common misperception. Most
permanent resident aliens are like Hyung Joon Kim who was brought to the
United States when he was six years old and became a permanent resident
alien when he was eight.309 Kim committed what the court calls "ordinary
crimes" which are the basis for his removal. 3'0 The Ninth Circuit recognized
that most cases are similar to the Kim case, and thus, "[n]o responsible court
will leave an 'unprotected spot in the Nation's armor,"' and the Ninth
Circuit's decision did not do so.
31
'
The Supreme Court's decision in Zadvydas appeased many legal
writers, many of whom urged in their writings for the Court to follow the
lead of the Ninth Circuit by finding that under the statute, the detention of
resident aliens could only continue for a reasonable period. 32" However, after
the decision, the ball is now back in Congress' court, which leaves many
wondering whether one writer's hypothesis will prove true, that indefinite
detention was the intent of Congress under the IIRIRA. 1 3 In the meantime,
we can only hope that the tragic consequences of the inaction by Congress to
Sentence, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 390, 459 (2001).
306. Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523, 528 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted sub nom. Demore v. Kim,
122 S. Ct. 2696 (2002).
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 538.
310. Id.
311. Id. The court held that a permanent resident alien in removal proceedings has a right to an
individualized decision regarding a right to bail based on the particular circumstances of the case.
Id. at 538-39.
312. Maria V. Morris, The Exit Fiction: Unconstitutional Indefinite Detention of Deportable
Aliens, 23 Hous. J. INT'L L. 255, 304 (200 1).
313. Kevin Costello, Without a Country: Indefinite Detention as Constitutional Purgatory, 3 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 503, 539 (2001) (pointing out the question that remained after the Ninth Circuit's
decision: "what if this brand of governmental cruelty is precisely what Congress intended to
allow?").
fix the IIRIRA, such as Thanom Pasavtoy, a Laotian alien in INS custody
who hung himself in 1999 when he learned that it was unlikely he would
ever be released,1 4 do not repeat themselves as detainees wait for Congress
to respond to the Zadvydas decision. Further, legal scholars and
constitutional experts can only hope that the testimony Congress has heard
since September 11, 2001 will convince Congress to protect the civil rights
of all persons in America. Although Americans are nervous after the
terrorist attacks and some blame the INS for not tracking the immigrant
terrorists in the nation, we must not lose sight of the principles our nation
and Constitution are based on, the same principles and laws which afford
resident aliens due process rights. As law professor Margaret Taylor said in
her testimony before Congress, "it is expensive, and it is inhumane, to
assume that detention is the only tool in the INS enforcement arsenal that
can be used to 'restore credibility' to the immigration system. 3t 5
Our nation is capable of using the "special circumstance" exception
carved out in Zadvydas appropriately in cases such as terrorism, which may
call for prolonged or preventive detention for terrorists like Osama Bin
Laden. However, the nation must keep in mind the honorable William
Fletcher's statement that "our 'Nation's armor' includes our Constitution,
the central text of our civic faith. It is the foundation of everything that
makes our country's system of laws and freedoms worth defending." 31 6 The
permanent legal residents affected by the Zadvydas decision are not
terrorists, and we must remember that when we uphold our laws by
removing them, we must also uphold our Constitution, the foundation of our
nation.
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